The following report about intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program was published on Sept. 15 by the Atlantic Council. The link to the full report is at the bottom:
For a country that has been accumulating nuclear know-how since the Eisenhower administration, Iran has hardly been sprinting toward a bomb. Indeed, repeated prognostications that Tehran was on the verge of becoming a nuclear power have a Chicken Little quality: The sky did not fall over the past decade, and it seems unlikely to do so for the next year or two or three. Still, Iran has made steady progress accumulating the elements and expertise required to make nuclear weapons, and it would be naive and irresponsible to discount what appears to be a cottage industry of piecemeal proliferation.
Collecting intelligence about the program has never been easy, and has been hurt by Iran’s spotty cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent years, along with Iran’s long history of telling less than the whole story about its nuclear work. Iranian officials also have a tendency toward bluster that can contribute to both overestimating and underestimating the program. Solid evidence of efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capability has come from technical surveillance, human penetration, and interception of weapons-related imports, as well as Iran’s continued production of ever higher grades of enriched uranium with no obvious near-term civilian use. So far, however, there has been no smoking gun when it comes to Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions.
The IAEA and the UN Security Council, with the support of their member states, should continue to press for more and better access to Iran’s nuclear sites and personnel. Intelligence professionals should maintain high critical standards as they evaluate new information. While seeking negotiations, the U.S. and its allies should stress targeted sanctions, stepped-up interdiction of nuclear and dual-use materials, and sabotage of nuclear-related raw materials, equipment, and computer software in order to inhibit Iran’s nuclear weapons potential.
The five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty could create a more conducive atmosphere for a diplomatic solution by better fulfilling their own disarmament commitments, including building down their arsenals and forswearing nuclear weapons testing. They should also work harder to persuade North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and non-signatory nuclear powers Pakistan, India, and Israel to curb nuclear weapons production. Key Iranian trading partners such as China and Turkey should use their economic leverage to convince Iran to satisfy the international community’s concerns.
