On Feb. 26, 2025, the United States sanctioned six companies based in Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China involved in procuring components for Iran’s drone and ballistic missile programs. “Iran continues to try to find new ways to procure the key components it needs to bolster its UAV weapons program through new front companies and third-country suppliers,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury remains committed to disrupting the schemes that enable Iran to send its deadly weapons abroad to its terrorist proxies and other destabilizing actors.” Iran, which lacks modern aircraft, depends on drones and ballistic missiles for airpower. The following are press releases from the Treasury and State Departments on the new sanctions.
Treasury Department
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is targeting six entities based in Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), engaged in the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components on behalf of OFAC-designated Iranian firm Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB) and its subsidiary Narin Sepehr Mobin Isatis (NSMI). These entities operate as front companies and facilitate the purchase and shipment of key components for the benefit of PKGB and NSMI, which serve as key suppliers for Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile programs. OFAC previously designated a network of Hong Kong-based companies procuring sensitive Western-origin materials and technology for Iran’s UAV and missile programs on behalf of PKGB in February 2024. Today’s action, which supports President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran, targets efforts by PKGB to reconstitute its procurement network and continue the procurement of critical parts from foreign suppliers post-designation.
“Iran continues to try to find new ways to procure the key components it needs to bolster its UAV weapons program through new front companies and third-country suppliers,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury remains committed to disrupting the schemes that enable Iran to send its deadly weapons abroad to its terrorist proxies and other destabilizing actors.”
Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. This action builds on August 28, 2019 and February 2, 2024 actions targeting PKGB’s covert procurement network benefitting Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile production.
OFAC designated PKGB pursuant to E.O. 13382 on August 28, 2019 for being owned or controlled by Hamed Dehghan (Dehghan), PKGB’s chief executive officer and chairman, who was concurrently designated for his central role in facilitating the procurement of military-grade electronic components for Rastafann Engineering Company (Rastafann). Rastafann was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Naval Defence Missile Industry Group. PKGB subsidiary NSMI was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on February 2, 2024 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, PKGB.
HONG KONG-BASED FRONT COMPANIES AND FACILITATORS
PKGB operates a network of Hong Kong-based procurement front companies that facilitate the purchase and shipment to Iran of aviation parts with UAV applications valued in millions of dollars. Since the February 2024 designations targeting PKGB’s Hong Kong-based front companies, PKGB has utilized new companies to continue its procurement activities. Dingtai Industrial Technology Co Limited (Dingtai) has procured U.S.-origin UAV-applicable items including valve assemblies, radio frequency (RF) connectors, and engines on behalf of PKGB. Yonghongan Trade Limited (Yonghongan) has been used by multiple PKGB front companies after the February 2024 designations, including OFAC-designated Advantage Trading Company Limited (Advantage), to procure Western-origin aircraft components. Yonghongan has also been used by OFAC-designated PKGB front company Duling Technology Limited (Duling) to purchase millions of dollars of Western-origin UAV-applicable aircraft parts, falsely listing Yonghongan as the purchaser of parts including vane turbines, vane compressors, blade turbines, and blade compressors. Hong Kong Tianle International Co Limited (Tianle) was used by PKGB to facilitate price quotes and the procurement of U.S.-origin electronic components for Rastafann. Tianle was also used by Advantage to procure thousands of micro servos on behalf of PKGB, falsely listing Tianle as the buyer.
Dingtai, Yonghongan, and Tianle are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, PKGB.
PKGB subsidiary NSMI has received shipments of UAV-applicable equipment from Hong Kong and PRC-based companies. NSMI was the consignee for engine shipments from Hong Kong-based DDC Develop Industry Hong Kong Limited (DDC Develop). PRC-based Shenzhen Zhiyu International Trade Co Ltd (Shenzhen Zhiyu) exported production and testing equipment to NSMI. Hong Kong-based JP Oriental International Holdings Limited (JP Oriental) exported shipments over the course of multiple years to NSMI.
DDC Develop, Shenzhen Zhiyu, and JP Oriental are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, NSMI.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated person(s) described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons is/are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Exports, reexports, or transfers of items subject to U.S. export controls involving persons included on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13382 may be subject to additional restrictions administered by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. See 15 C.F.R. section 744.8 for additional information.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
Click here for more information on the entities designated today.
State Department
The United States is today sanctioning six entities based in the People’s Republic of China, including Hong Kong, that have been involved in the procurement of key components by entities connected to Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile programs.
Today’s action, which is part of President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign on the Iranian regime, aims to disrupt efforts by the Iranian entity Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB) to reconstitute its procurement network and continue obtaining critical parts from foreign suppliers.
The United States will use all available means to expose and disrupt Iran’s growing UAV and missile development and proliferation, which destabilizes the Middle East and beyond.We will continue to act against the complex schemes Iran employs to conceal its acquisition of sensitive technology for its missile and UAV programs. These programs produce missiles and drones that Iran uses against our allies and exports to its terror proxy groups and Russia.