On March 13, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iran’s oil minister, Mohsen Paknejad, along with companies in Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India and other locations, for involvement in transporting Iranian oil to China in violation of U.S. sanctions. China is reportedly the destination for some 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. The Trump administration, as part of its “maximum pressure” campaign, is attempting to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero.
“The Iranian regime continues to use the proceeds from the nation’s vast oil resources to advance its narrow, alarming self-interests at the expense of the Iranian people,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will fight and disrupt any attempts by the regime to fund its destabilizing activities and further its dangerous agenda.”
Additionally, the State Department designated three companies and identified three vessels involved in smuggling Iranian oil or petroleum products. “These entities provide services to the ghost fleet vessels conducting ship-to-ship (STS) transfer operations outside port limits in Southeast Asia, and enabling Iran’s attempts to disguise its illicit oil trade,” said Spokesperson Tammy Bruce. The following are statements from the Treasury and State Departments.
Treasury Department
Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating Iran’s Minister of Petroleum, Mohsen Paknejad, who oversees the export of tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil and has allocated billions of dollars’ worth of oil to Iran’s armed forces for export. OFAC is also designating several entities in multiple jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, for their ownership or operation of vessels that have delivered Iranian oil to the PRC, or lifted Iranian oil from storage in Dalian, PRC. Today’s sanctions apply further pressure on the “shadow fleet” and other vessels upon which Iran depends to deliver its oil to the PRC, advancing United States’ commitment to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero.
“The Iranian regime continues to use the proceeds from the nation’s vast oil resources to advance its narrow, alarming self-interests at the expense of the Iranian people,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will fight and disrupt any attempts by the regime to fund its destabilizing activities and further its dangerous agenda.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which target Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, and marks the third round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025, ordering a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran.
Concurrently, the State Department is designating three entities pursuant to E.O. 13846 and identifying three vessels as blocked property in which these entities have an interest.
Iran’s MINISTER OF PETROLEUM
Mohsen Paknejad (Paknejad) serves as Iran’s Minister of Petroleum and has overseen the Ministry of Petroleum since his appointment in August 2024. Iran’s Minister of Petroleum oversees Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and is responsible for all aspects of Iran’s oil industry, which generates tens of billions of dollars annually for the regime. Under his leadership, Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum has allocated billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil to the Iranian armed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces, both critical instruments in the regime’s tools of oppression. Some 200,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil are allocated to the Iranian armed forces daily to supplement their budget.
The armed forces’ annual allocation of Iranian oil is set to increase. Recent budget estimates point to a four-fold dollar increase in oil allocations, exceeding 10 billion dollars annually and totaling over 500,000 barrels per day. By the end of 2025, over half of Iran’s total oil revenues will be allocated to its armed forces.
Paknejad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.
Shadow FLEET OIL SHIPMENTS
Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum and the Iranian armed forces rely on a vast shadow fleet of vessels to disguise oil shipments worth billions of dollars for delivery to the PRC.
Hong Kong-flagged PEACE HILL (IMO: 9288019) has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil from the Changxhing Port in Dalian, PRC on behalf of the Iranian military. Since early 2024, San Marino-flagged SEASKY (IMO: 9237412) has transported tens of thousands of metric tons of fuel oil on behalf of NIOC to the PRC. Panama-flagged CORONA FUN (IMO: 9276573) has also transported Iranian oil and has used automatic identification system (AIS) manipulation to disguise its efforts to ship Iranian crude oil.
Hong Kong-based Hong Kong Heshun Transportation Trading Limited is the owner and operator of the PEACE HILL. Hong Kong-based Seasky Marine Co., Limited is the owner, operator, and manager of the SEASKY. Hong Kong-based Sun Science International Co., Limited is the owner, operator, and manager of the CORONA FUN.
Hong Kong Heshun Transportation Trading Limited, Seasky Marine Co., Limited, and Sun Science International Co., Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. PEACE HILL is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Hong Kong Heshun Transportation Trading Limited has an interest. The SEASKY is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Seasky Marine Co., Limited has an interest. CORONA FUN is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Sun Science International Co., Limited has an interest.
Iran-flagged POLARIS 1 (IMO: 9272694) has transported tens of thousands of metric tons of NIOC fuel oil. The Cameroon-flagged LEXI (IMO: 9203277) has engaged in ship-to-ship transfers to transport millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil.
Seychelles-registered Fallon Shipping Company Limited and Bangladesh-based Aren Ship Management serve as the owner and technical manager of the POLARIS 1, respectively. Fallon Shipping Company Limited and Aren Ship Management are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. POLARIS 1 is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Fallon Shipping Company Limited has an interest. Suriname-based Sea Services Providers NV serves as the owner and operator of the LEXI. Sea Services Providers NV is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy LEXI is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Sea Services Providers NV has an interest.
In addition, Comoros-flagged ITAUGUA (IMO: 9102277), Panama-flagged NESO (IMO: 9257149), Palau-flagged LYDYA N (IMO: 9153525) and BLUE GULF (IMO: 9328716), and Barbados-flagged SHANNON II (IMO: 9237797)have also shipped Iranian oil.
Liberia-registered Itaugua Services Inc serves as the owner and operator of the ITAUGUA. Marshall Islands-registered Neptune Marine Ltd and PRC-based Huaxia Trading Ltdserve as the owner and manager of the NESO, respectively. Seychelles-registered Turquoise Sea Marine Limited serves as the registered owner of the LYDYA N. Marshall Islands-based United Tankers Ltd and India-based Lake View Ship Management Private Limited serve as the owner and manager of the BLUE GULF, respectively. Marshall Islands-registered Celestite Maritime Inc and Sri Lanka-based Marine Solution Pvt Ltd serve as the registered owner and technical manager of the SHANNON II, respectively.
Itaugua Services Inc, Neptune Marine Ltd, Huaxia Trading Ltd, Turquoise Sea Marine Limited, United Tankers Ltd, Lake View Ship Management Private Limited, Celestite Maritime Inc, and Marine Solution Pvt Ltd, are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.
ITAUGUA is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Itaugua Services Inc has an interest. NESO is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Neptune Marine Ltd has an interest. LYDYA N is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Turquoise Sea Marine Limited has an interest. BLUE GULF is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which United Tankers Ltd has an interest. SHANNON II is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as blocked property in which Celestite Maritime Inc has an interest.
STATE DEPARTMENT DESIGNATIONS
The U.S. Department of State is designating three entities and is identifying three vessels as blocked property in which these entities have an interest.
Singapore-based Shipload Maritime PTE. LTD., and Indonesia-based PT. Bintang Samudra Utama and PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama are being designated pursuant to E.O 13846 for having knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.
The Indonesia-flagged Malili (IMO: 9179921) is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which Shipload Maritime PTE. LTD. has an interest. The Indonesia-flagged CELEBES (IMO: 8710730) is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in PT. Bintang Samudra Utama has an interest. The Indonesia-flagged Marina Vision (IMO: 8106109) is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13846 as property in which PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama has an interest.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here.
View identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
State Department
The Department of State is sanctioning three entities and identifying three vessels as blocked property today to stop the flow of revenue the Iranian regime uses to finance its destabilizing activities. These entities provide services to the ghost fleet vessels conducting ship-to-ship (STS) transfer operations outside port limits in Southeast Asia, and enabling Iran’s attempts to disguise its illicit oil trade.
The Department of the Treasury is concurrently designating Iran’s Minister of Petroleum Mohsen Paknejad and several entities transporting Iranian oil to China, and will identify their vessels as blocked property. The Iranian regime and its military are stealing the nation’s oil wealth with the help of Mohsen Paknejad, the head of Iran’s Oil Ministry.
Today’s action advances President Trump’s policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian regime, which is designed to end Iran’s nuclear threat, curtail its ballistic missile program, and stop it from supporting or rebuilding its terrorist proxy groups, including by driving Iran’s oil exports to zero — especially oil exports to China.
We will continue to disrupt illicit funding to curb malign activities, limit the financial resources available to corrupt officials, and use all the tools at our disposal to hold the regime accountable.
State Department Fact Sheet
The Iranian regime continues to fuel conflict in the Middle East, advance its nuclear program, and support its terrorist proxies. Iran’s illicit oil trade fuels these destabilizing activities. Its oil exports are enabled by a network of shipping facilitators in multiple jurisdictions who, through obfuscation and deception, load and transport Iranian oil for sale to buyers in Asia. Iran’s MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM, NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, and NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY, U.S.-designated entities, rely significantly on ship-to-ship (STS) transfers and associated third-country service providers to optimize the efficiency of their tanker fleet. These STS transfers, frequently conducted while one or more vessels have disabled or manipulated their automatic identification system (AIS), also serve to disguise the Iranian origin of the cargo.
Today, the United States is acting under President Trump’s policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian regime to stop the flow of revenue it uses to fund these destabilizing activities. The Department of State is imposing sanctions on three entities engaged in the Iranian petroleum trade and is identifying three vessels as blocked property. These targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes and reimposes certain sanctions with respect to Iran.
Specifically, the Department of State is targeting maritime service providers that have facilitated the STS transfer of Iranian crude oil between U.S.-designated STAR FOREST (IMO 9237632) and SOBAR (IMO 9221970) on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia. Today, we seek to degrade Iran’s STS operations and to highlight the risks associated with facilitating Iran’s crude oil trade.
The Department is designating the following entity pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran:
- PT. BINTANG SAMUDRA UTAMA (BINTANG) knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the transport of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran using CELEBES, a vessel for which BINTANG is the commercial manager, operator, and registered owner, to facilitate the STS transfer between STAR FOREST and SOBAR on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.
CELEBES (IMO 8710730) is being identified as property in which BINTANG has an interest. CELEBES was used to maneuver STAR FOREST and SOBAR into position for an STS transfer of Iranian crude oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.
Pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846, the following entity is being designated for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran:
- SHIPLOAD MARITIME PTE. LTD. (SHIPLOAD MARITIME) knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the transport of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran using MALILI, a vessel for which SHIPLOAD MARITIME is the commercial manager and operator, to facilitate the STS transfer between SOBAR and STAR FOREST on December 25, 2024.
MALILI (IMO 9179921) is being identified as property in which SHIPLOAD MARITIME has an interest. MALILI was used to maneuver STAR FOREST and SOBAR into position for an STS transfer of Iranian crude oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.
Pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846, the following entity is being designated for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran:
- PT. GIANIRA ADHINUSA SENATAMA (GIANIRA) knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the transport of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran using MARINA VISION, a vessel for which GIANIRA is the commercial manager, operator, and registered owner, to facilitate the STS transfer between SOBAR and STAR FOREST on December 25, 2024.
MARINA VISION (IMO 8106109) is being identified as property in which GIANIRA has an interest. MARINA VISION was used to maneuver STAR FOREST and SOBAR into position for an STS transfer of Iranian crude oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.