The head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog and officials from Western powers criticized Iran for failing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during a meeting of its 35-member Board of Governors from March 3 to March 7, 2025. Director General Rafael Grossi warned that the agency is still unable to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. He noted that there had been “no significant process” on implementing a March 2023 agreement with Iran to resolve outstanding safeguards issues. Grossi expressed serious concerns over several issues, including:
- traces of uranium found at undeclared locations
- a discrepancy in the material balance of uranium involved in uranium metal production experiments (a process that would be necessary to build a bomb)
- Iran’s refusal to allow the designation of four additional IAEA inspectors
The United States outlined steps Iran could take to pave the way to an agreement on its nuclear program. “If Iran wants a deal, the path starts with ceasing its escalatory nuclear activities, fulfilling its safeguards obligations, building international confidence, and allowing the Agency to provide assurance that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful,” Howard Solomon, the U.S. ad interim charge’ d’affaires said on March 4. He also noted that “Iran is the only country in the world producing highly enriched uranium that does not have nuclear weapons.”
In a joint statement, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States warned that, absent “concrete, technically credible progress,” the Board of Governors “must be prepared to consider finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.” That could lead to a censure resolution and U.N. Security Council action, including sanctions. “We do not take such a course lightly,” the Western powers added. “We reiterate that our efforts are intended to provide resolute support to the Agency in its safeguards investigations in Iran, for the sake of international security and the integrity of the global non-proliferation architecture.” The following are statements from the Board of Governors meeting.
Rafael Grossi on March 3, 2025
Madame Chairperson,
Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
Following my last report, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U 235 has increased to 275 kg, up from 182 kg in the past quarter. Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State enriching to this level, causing me serious concern.
It has been four years since Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and therefore it is also four years since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access in Iran.
You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran says it has declared all nuclear material, activities and locations required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. However, this statement is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran. The Agency needs to know the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment involved.
There is also a discrepancy in the material balance of uranium involved in uranium metal production experiments conducted at Jaber Ibn Hayan Mutlipurpose Laboratory, for which Iran has not accounted.
Having stated it had suspended such implementation, Iran still is not implementing modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran.
I am seriously concerned that the outstanding safeguards issues remain unresolved. They stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
I deeply regret that Iran, despite having indicated a willingness to consider accepting the designation of four additional experienced Agency inspectors, did not accept their designation.
There has been no significant progress towards implementing the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023. I call upon Iran urgently to implement the Joint Statement through serious engagement.
In response to the Board’s request in its resolution of November 2024, I will produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the presence and use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
High-level engagement is indispensable to making real progress. My visit to Tehran last November, and meetings with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indicate that there may be room for constructive compromises. I hope to see them again soon and pursue effective dialogue and tangible results.
U.S. statement delivered by Charge’ d’Affaires, ad interim, Howard Solomon on March 4, 2025
Chair,
The United States extends its appreciation to the Director General for his February 26 report on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231. We thank the Director General and the Secretariat for their continued dedication and professionalism in implementing the Agency’s critical responsibilities in Iran.
Chair,
The content of the DG’s report is extremely alarming, and it underscores the existential threat that Iran’s nuclear program poses to the international community. Iran is the only country in the world producing highly enriched uranium that does not have nuclear weapons. Rather than seek to build confidence, Iran continues to accelerate its program and deploy advanced centrifuges, without any credible civilian justification. Regrettably, Iran is doubling down on its nuclear escalations. It appears Iran is attempting either to extort the international community or hedge closer toward nuclear weapons. I will be plain and simple: this is a very dangerous strategy for Iran. We will not be extorted.
As the Board will address later in the agenda, Iran’s continued stonewalling on longstanding safeguards concerns and refusal to implement its legal safeguards obligations, are completely unacceptable. Iran should be providing greater transparency, not less. It should be implementing the Additional Protocol, not limiting inspections. It should be ending its production of highly enriched uranium, not accelerating it. And it should be accepting the designation of Agency inspectors, not undermining the Agency’s verification.
Iran de-designated inspectors after failing, in violation of its safeguards obligations, to declare its modification of advanced centrifuges at Fordow. Inspectors detected those modifications at Fordow, and uranium particles there enriched to more than 80 percent. Iran’s response was to de-designate the inspectors. Once again, Iran’s conduct is as unambiguous as it is condemnable.
Chair,
If Iran wants a deal, the path starts with ceasing its escalatory nuclear activities, fulfilling its safeguards obligations, building international confidence, and allowing the Agency to provide assurance that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. I will underscore, continuing to move in the opposite direction will only move Iran further from its goals and the deal it is looking for.
Chair,
With these comments, the United States takes note of the DG’s report in document GOV/2025/8 and requests it be made public. Thank you.
Quad statement delivered by U.K. Ambassador Corinne Kitsell on behalf of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on March 5, 2025
Chair,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States commend the Agency for its continued efforts to engage Iran to clarify the outstanding issues related to the implementation of Iran’s NPT-required Safeguards Agreement. We thank the Director General for his report on these issues, which are critical to understanding the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
We deeply regret that, for more than five years, Iran has refused to provide required clarifications regarding nuclear material detected at multiple undeclared locations in Iran. The Director General and the Board have made clear repeatedly that Iran is legally required to provide this cooperation. Iran has failed to do so despite the concerted efforts of the Director General and this Board to provide Iran every opportunity. As a result of Iran’s longstanding denials, the Agency is still unable to provide critical assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful and that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. These issues are fundamental to Iran’s safeguards obligations and the broader non-proliferation regime. No State can be allowed to violate its safeguards obligations with impunity. Iran must fully cooperate, or the Board must be prepared to find Iran in noncompliance. Until now, Iran has made its choice. Let us be clear: unless Iran changes course, it will force the Board to make its own choice. Time is not on Iran’s side.
This report recalls the IAEA’s assessment of some of the deeply concerning activities that Iran did not declare, at Turquzabad, Varamin, Marivan and Lavisan-Shian. It is of significant concern that due to the lack of information being provided by Iran, the IAEA concluded it would be unable to continue its efforts to resolve the safeguards issues at Lavisan-Shian. We note that the IAEA’s technical assessment of the activities at Marivan has not changed, that Iran has not provided technically credible information, and therefore the issue remains unresolved. We also want to highlight the lack of progress towards resolving the discrepancy issue at Jaber Ibn Hayan Laboratory, which still has to be explained by Iran. Iran continues to reject and challenge the IAEA’s technical assessment of the activities at these undeclared sites rather than engaging the IAEA constructively towards resolving the outstanding issues. We reiterate our support for the IAEA’s critical work. We underscore the value of the IAEA’s technical expertise and authority to investigate these issues to address concerns around the possibility of undeclared nuclear material and activity in Iran today.
Chair,
In his latest report, the Director General reiterates that Iran continues to refuse to provide design information for new nuclear facilities as legally required under modified Code 3.1. This is in contravention of Iran’s safeguards agreement. Iran’s unwillingness to provide the Agency with this information should be especially concerning given Iran’s history of building covert nuclear facilities. We also note that Iran has refused to accept the designation of four additional experienced inspectors. We recall the Director General’s statement that Iran’s previous decision to withdraw the designations of inspectors seriously affects the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran. We echo his deep regret that Iran did not accept these new designations.
Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA and its refusal to abide by its obligations under its safeguards agreement is deeply concerning in the context of Iran’s continuous escalation of its nuclear programme to levels with no credible civilian justification. Our concern is intensified by the increasing number of senior Iranian officials who have publicly claimed that Iran has the technical capability to build a nuclear weapon and called for a change to Iran’s so-called “nuclear doctrine”. We recall that the Director General assessed in his report in May 2024 that such remarks increased his concerns about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.
We commend the Agency’s efforts to engage Iran to seek progress. However, after years of delay, Iran must finally and fully meet its commitments and obligations rather than dangle promises of discussions in the future which we have heard many times before.
Chair,
It is important that the Board supports the IAEA by the strongest means necessary to pursue clarity on the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Board adopted two resolutions in 2024, which once again urged Iran to cooperate. Iran ignored these, as it has ignored opportunities in previous years. We reiterate our call on Iran to resume urgently full cooperation with the IAEA and to implement fully its safeguards agreement.
We recall that this Board, in its last resolution of November 2024, mandated the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment of the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in Iran in connection with past and present outstanding issues. This document will provide a clear, technical and objective foundation to assess Iran’s compliance with its safeguards agreement. As the resolution sets out, it will include the Agency’s assessment of its ability to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations and the non-diversion of nuclear material. The assessment will also include a full account of Iran’s cooperation with the Agency on the issues to date.
It is up to Iran to provide the technically credible explanations and substantive cooperation needed to inform the Agency. We regret that despite having the time and opportunity to do so, Iran has not made any progress in the four months since this resolution was adopted. In recognition of the Director General’s last report, which states that “the Agency is at an impasse” with regard to resolving these issues, we believe the comprehensive assessment should be delivered as soon as possible. It should be based on all information available to the Agency to provide the full picture, in order to inform the Board’s next steps on these issues. Iran has had many opportunities to resolve the issues.
Chair,
Our patience has been long, but it is not unlimited. We underscore, if there is no concrete, technically credible progress reported by the Director General, the Board must be prepared to consider finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
We do not take such a course lightly. We reiterate that our efforts are intended to provide resolute support to the Agency in its safeguards investigations in Iran, for the sake of international security and the integrity of the global non-proliferation architecture.
More than ever, there is an urgent need to address the lack of transparency and assurances on the nature of Iran’s advancing nuclear programme. Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA on its safeguards obligations is long overdue. Iran has had many chances over many years to cooperate, but Iran has instead chosen a path of escalation, obfuscation, and delay. Iran must be held to account if it continues along this path.
We again express our thanks for the IAEA’s continued efforts and ask for the report to be made public.
Thank you, Chair.
E3 statement on behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on March 5, 2025
On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank Director General Grossi for his latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Once again, we commend the Agency’s professional, independent and impartial work and their objective reporting on Iran’s nuclear programme. Unfortunately, the Agency’s findings are gravely concerning. The IAEA’s latest report confirms that Iran continues to undertake activities in blatant violation of the JCPoA and that there has been no improvement in its cooperation with the IAEA. The extent of Iran’s enrichment activities is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons, and have no credible civilian justification. The IAEA is currently unable to verify that Iran’s escalating nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. This taken together with the recent statements by high-ranking Iranian officials calling for a change in Iran’s so-called nuclear doctrine, poses a serious threat to international security, and the non-proliferation regime.
Chair,
In the reporting period Iran has further expanded its enriched uranium stockpile and enrichment capacity. Iran has increased its stockpile of high enriched uranium by an alarming 50% since the last reporting period. Iran now has six significant quantities of high enriched uranium, which the Agency defines as six times the approximate amount of nuclear material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Iran’s overall stockpile of enriched uranium is now approximately 40 times the limit Iran committed to in the JCPoA.
Iran has increased the rate of production of high enriched uranium at the underground Fordow facility by seven times compared to the previous reporting period. And overall, Iran is now producing roughly one significant quantity of highly enriched uranium every six weeks. In addition, Iran has substantially expanded its enriched uranium production capacity by installing and operating new advanced centrifuges. In the reporting period, it has begun operating 5 new cascades in Fordow and 13 cascades in Natanz. It remains particularly concerning that enrichment continues to take place at Fordow, which we recall is a former undeclared enrichment facility.
As a result of Iran’s continued non-cooperation and lack of transparency, the DG’s latest report restates that the Agency has lost and will not be able to restore continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.
Iran refuses to re-designate several experienced Agency inspectors. This is a politically motivated decision which seriously affects the IAEA’s ability to conduct its verification in Iran, particularly at its enrichment facilities. We deeply regret that Iran has not accepted the designation of the four additional experienced inspectors after pledging to consider it ahead of the November 2024 Board of Governors meeting.
The DG’s report also notes that it has been four years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol, depriving the Agency of complementary access to critical sites and locations in Iran. Alongside this we remain alarmed by Iran’s repeated threats to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This poses a serious threat to the non-proliferation system upon which we all rely.
Chair,
The E3 have consistently worked towards a diplomatic solution to address Iran’s nuclear programme. In 2022 it was Iran who twice refused a negotiated outcome and instead escalated and expanded its nuclear programme. Let us be clear: Iran has chosen to escalate its nuclear programme, far beyond the limits it committed to in the JCPoA and far beyond any credible civilian use, thereby causing a proliferation crisis.
We therefore urgently call on Iran to change course, and:
(i) Halt and reverse its nuclear escalation and refrain from making threats regarding nuclear weapons; (ii) Return to the limits imposed by the JCPoA, in particular those regarding enrichment levels and enriched uranium stockpiles; (iii) Implement the Iran-IAEA March 2023 Joint statement and the commitments it made regarding transparency and cooperation with the IAEA including re-applying all transparency measures that it stopped in February 2021; (iv) Allow the Agency to install surveillance and monitoring equipment where requested; (v) Re-implement and swiftly ratify the Additional Protocol; and (vi) Fully reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw the designations of experienced inspectors.
Chair,
In light of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme, there is an urgent need to address these concerns. The international community must remain united and firm in its determination to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The E3 will continue to work towards a diplomatic solution, and we stand ready to use all diplomatic levers to achieve this goal.
We ask the Director General to keep the Board informed on all relevant activities and developments within Iran’s alarming nuclear programme by regular and, if deemed necessary, extraordinary reporting. We ask for this report to be made public.
Thank you.