On Sept. 10, 2024, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany announced new sanctions on Iran after accusing it of transferring ballistic missiles to Russia for the first time. The “supply of Iranian missiles enables Russia to use more of its arsenal for targets that are further from the frontline, while dedicating the new missiles it’s receiving from Iran for closer-range targets,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned. “For its part, Russia is sharing technology that Iran seeks – this is a two-way street – including on nuclear issues as well as some space information.”
The U.S. Treasury designated 10 Iranian and Russian officials and businessmen and six companies -- including Iran Air, the country’s flagship airline -- for enabling Iran’s delivery of weapons components and weapons systems, including drones and missiles, to Russia. The State Department also sanctioned Iran Air and two Russia-based shipping companies.
The three European powers, known as the E3, called the missile transfer “an escalation by both Iran and Russia,” and “a direct threat to European security.” The E3 also announced the cancellation of bilateral air services with Iran and pledged to follow up with designations of individuals and entities linked to Tehran’s weapons programs. The European Union pledged a “strong response” and presented its 27 member states with a set of punitive measures for approval.
The G7 countries also condemned Iran's export of missiles to Russia. Iran “must immediately cease all support to Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable war against Ukraine and halt such transfers of ballistic missiles, UAVs and related technology, which constitute a direct threat to the Ukrainian people as well as European and international security more broadly,” the foreign ministers of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States said in a joint statement on September 14.
Iranian officials condemned the U.S. and European measures. The sanctions were “the continuation of the West's hostile policy and economic terrorism against the people of Iran, and it will face a proportionate response by Iran,” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanaani said on September 10. On the following day, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the Western powers were “acting on faulty intelligence and flawed logic.” Brigadier Fazlollah Nozari rejected the claim that Iran had shipped missiles to Russia.
Russia has increasingly relied on Iranian and North Korean arms supplies as the war in Ukraine has dragged on. Tehran provided suicide drones that Russia allegedly deployed against both government and civilian targets. By December 2022, Iran had become Russia’s “top military backer,” John Kirby of the National Security Council claimed. The following are statements from the United States and the E3 countries.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken
At a joint press availability with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy on Sept. 10, 2024: “Now, to wage its war of aggression on Ukraine, Putin is also relying increasingly on help from Iran and the DPRK, in these instances to get actual weapons, in clear violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Now, Tehran has long supplied deadly drones. It’s built a drone factory in Russia. It’s trained Russian personnel on how to operate them. For some time, the United States has warned of an additional threat: the provision by Iran of ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. We’ve warned Tehran publicly, we’ve warned Tehran privately that taking this step would constitute a dramatic escalation. Dozens of Russian military personnel have been trained in Iran to use the Fath-360 close-range ballistic missile system, which has a maximum range of 75 miles. Russia has now received shipments of these ballistic missiles and will likely use them within weeks in Ukraine against Ukrainians.
“Russia has an array of its own ballistic missiles, but the supply of Iranian missiles enables Russia to use more of its arsenal for targets that are further from the frontline, while dedicating the new missiles it’s receiving from Iran for closer-range targets. This development and the growing cooperation between Russia and Iran threatens European security and demonstrates how Iran’s destabilizing influence reaches far beyond the Middle East. For its part, Russia is sharing technology that Iran seeks – this is a two-way street – including on nuclear issues as well as some space information. So as Iran’s destabilizing activities spread, so does Russia, sowing even greater insecurity in their regions and around the world.
“In recent days, we’ve been sharing intelligence behind these findings with our allies and partners, and working together to ensure that there will be significant economic consequences for Tehran’s actions. The United States will be announcing further sanctions on Iran later today, including additional measures on Iran Air. We expect allies and partners will be announcing their own new measures on Iran as well. Iran’s new president and foreign minister have repeatedly said that they want to restore engagement with Europe, they want to receive sanctions relief. Destabilizing actions like these will achieve exactly the opposite.”
Interview with Yalda Hakim of Sky News on Sept. 10, 2024:
QUESTION: We heard you earlier today talk about Iran shipping ballistic missiles to Russia. You said they’re going to be used on Ukrainians in the next few weeks.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: That’s right.
QUESTION: We’re also hearing about economic sanctions being imposed on Iran. I guess it makes me think, are you just kicking the can down the road? What exactly is the Iran strategy? Because it doesn’t feel like economic sanctions is going to cut it.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, two things. First, let’s look at what they’re doing, which is providing Russia with ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine. These are missiles that have a relatively short range, but what it means is that the Russians can free up their own longer-range ballistic missiles, which they’ve been using on near-in targets, to range even more of Ukraine, including all the way west to Lviv, civilian targets of one kind or another, energy infrastructure. So this is a material difference that’s not a good one.
I think you’ve seen just in the last few hours the United States come out and now, just in recent minutes, European partners making it clear that we are taking and will take additional actions against Iran in response to what they’re doing. We’ve been clear with the Iranians as we saw this brewing that this would have consequences if they went ahead and did it. There will be consequences. And —
QUESTION: And they have done it, though.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: They have done it. But the consequences will be there. And this is at a time when we know from the new Iranian president that they desperately need and want some economic relief, that there’s a very heavy burden on the country, and that they’re looking for that. This is exactly the opposite way to get what they purport to want – better relations with other countries and some relief from the sanctions that have been imposed on them for their conduct.
Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder
Press briefing on Sept. 10, 2024:
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: And staying in the CENTCOM AOR, as announced earlier today by Secretary of State Blinken, the United States has confirmed reports that Iran has transferred shipments of Fateh 360 close range ballistic missiles to Russia, which we assess could employ them within weeks against Ukraine, leading to the deaths of even more Ukrainian civilians.
To echo our State Department and White House colleagues, this is a deeply concerning development, as this partnership between Iran and Russia threatens European security and illustrates how Iran's destabilizing influence reaches beyond the Middle East and around the world. Additionally, Russian support for Iran is destabilizing as well, as Moscow is sharing technology that Iran needs. We'll continue to monitor these developments alongside our allies and partners across Europe and the Middle East and remain steadfast in our support to Ukraine's defense from the threat these missile systems may pose to the people of Ukraine.
Q: Just a couple of things on the Iranian missiles, can you give us a broad estimate of how many you think have been delivered? Even if it's dozens, hundreds or whatever. there has been statements that dozens of Russians have been trained, so I would assume you have at least some sort of ballpark idea how much of this is getting into Russia? Have you seen any of them used yet or being positioned to be used? and then what do you think Iran is getting in exchange?
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: So, I'm able to address a few of those things. So as you highlight, we do believe that that dozens of Russian military personnel were trained in Iran to use this missile system. I'm not able to get into the intelligence in terms of the specific number of missiles. Needless to say, this is a concerning development as I highlighted.
And the thing about the missile is that you know, it is a short range or close range ballistic missile system. We estimate it has a maximum range of about 75 miles. So what this does is it would enable Russia to employ this capability while preserving its longer range capabilities for use throughout the battlefield, thus deepening Russia's arsenal and also again giving it the ability to strike the kinds of targets that we've seen then striking, to include Civilian targets.
And so we have not seen them employ them yet, but obviously keeping a close eye on that. And as you heard the State Department say earlier and the White House, there are sanctions being applied to include sanctions from our European allies.
Q: And what Iran is getting — what do you think Iran specifically has gotten in exchange for this specific?
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: So, you know, again without being going to go into specifics, we see them sharing information as it relates to nuclear programs, space and other technological capabilities that Russia has, that countries like Iran wants.
Treasury Department
Press release from Sept. 10, 2024:
Today, in response to Iran’s ongoing military support, including the recent delivery of ballistic missiles, to Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating ten individuals and six entities based in Iran and Russia and identifying four vessels as blocked property that are enabling Iran’s delivery of weapons components and weapons systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), to Russia. In late 2023, Iran and Russia signed a contract for the supply of hundreds of missiles. In the summer of 2024, Russian military personnel were trained on the use of Iran’s Project 360 CBRMs by Iranian personnel, and as of early September 2024, Russia received the first shipment of these CBRMs from Iran.
Concurrent with this action, international partners are announcing measures which will not allow Iran Air to operate in their territory in the future and are pursuing further designations of Iran- and Russia-based individuals, entities, and vessels involved in the transfer of Iranian lethal aid to Russia. The Department of State is concurrently designating three entities, including Iran Air, and identifying five vessels as blocked property involved in the proliferation of Iranian weapons systems to Russia.
“Today, the United States and our allies are taking concerted action in response to Iran’s reckless decision to proliferate ballistic missiles to Russia for use in its war of aggression against Ukraine, despite the censure from the international community in response to Iran’s provision of one-way attack UAVs to Russia, and the ample evidence of the destruction of civilian infrastructure caused by Russia’s use of such UAVs,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo. “Iran has opted to intensify its involvement in Russia’s illegal war, and the United States, along with our partners, will continue to stand with Ukraine.”
Treasury’s action today is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended; the WMD counterproliferation authority, E.O. 13382; and E.O. 14024, which targets Russia’s harmful foreign activities.
IRAN AIR
Tehran-based Iran Air is Iran’s flagship airline and operates both passenger and cargo flights. Iran Air has a history of transporting goods on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Iran has also provided freight shipping services to Russia, including shipments of electronics and aircraft parts.
Iran Air was previously identified as meeting the definition of Government of Iran pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13599 on November 5, 2018, for being owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. Concurrently, Treasury also identified 67 Iran Air-operated aircraft as blocked property on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List).
Today, Iran Air is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy. The Department of State is concurrently designating Iran Air pursuant to E.O. 13949, the Iran conventional arms authority, for materially contributing to the transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.
IRGC AND MODAFL OFFICIALS
Russia-based Ruhollah Katebi (Katebi) is the Russian government’s point of contact for Iran’s MODAFL in Moscow. In this capacity as a MODAFL official, Katebi has contributed to Russia’s preparations to take receipt of MODAFL’s Fath-360 CRBMs. On October 25, 2007, the Department of State designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.
Iran-based Ebrahim Bahrami (Bahrami) is an employee of Shahid Kharrazi Industries, a subordinate organization of Iran’s Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), and has been a point of contact in Iran for the Russian government and the training of Russian military personnel in Iran. On January 4, 2018, the Department of the Treasury designated Shahid Kharrazi Industries pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, SBIG, which the President included in the Annex to E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005.
Iran-based Ali Ja’farabadi (Ja’farabadi) is the Commander of the IRGC Air Force’s Salman Farsi Space Command. As commander of the IRGC Air Force’s Salman Farsi Space Command, Ja’farabadi has overseen satellite launches in Iran. On June 16, 2010, the Department of the Treasury designated the IRGC Air Force pursuant to E.O. 13382.
Katebi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, MODAFL. Bahrami is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahid Kharrazi Industries. Ja’farabadi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC Air Force.
TRANSMORFLOT UPDATE AND MG-FLOT VESSELS
On May 8, 2022, the Department of State designated Russia-based TransMorFlot LLC for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy. At the time of designation, vessels owned and managed by TransMorFlot LLC transported weapons for the Russian government. Concurrently, the Department of State identified Russia-flagged ETIM EMIN (IMO: 8700010) as property in which TransMorFlot LLC has an interest. On June 27, 2022, TransMorFlot LLC changed its name to MG-FLOT Limited Liability Company (MG-FLOT). In July 2022, MG-FLOT renamed the ETIM EMIN to the SAPFIR. This vessel regularly transits the Caspian Sea, bringing cargo between Iran and Russia. OFAC is updating TransMorFlot LLC and ETIM EMIN’s entries on the SDN List to include their new primary names, as well as updating other identifying information.
Dzhamaldin Emirmagomedovich Pashaev (Pashaev) owns or controls а network of Russian shipping companies that operate in Olya Port, Russia. Pashaev’s enterprises have been involved in Russian military exports since 2021, and have completed over 200 agreements related to the maritime transport of military goods around the world. Pashaev and his companies have been integral to the ongoing transfer of lethal aid to U.S.-designated Russian Joint Stock Company Special Economic Zone of Industrial Production Alabuga (SEZ Alabuga), which has been one of the primary assembly plants of UAVs for the Russian Ministry of Defense, with support from Iran. Pashaev is the current chairman of the board of МG-FLOT.
Russia-flagged BORIS KUSTODIEV (IMO: 9103817), PORT OLYA-3 (IMO: 9481910), PORT OLYA-4 (IMO: 9481934), and KOMPOZITOR RAKHMANINOV (IMO: 8606616) are vessels that are owned and operated by MG-FLOT. The BORIS KUSTODIEV, PORT OLYA-3, PORT OLYA-4, and KOMPOZITOR RAKHMANINOV regularly transit the Caspian Sea, bringing cargo between Iran and Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense used the vessel PORT OLYA-3 to transport CRBMs from Iran to Russia.
Today, Pashaev is being designated for operating or having operated in the defense or related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. BORIS KUSTODIEV, PORT OLYA-3, PORT OLYA-4, and KOMPOZITOR RAKHMANINOV are being identified pursuant to E.O. 14024 as property in which MG-FLOT, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, has an interest.
AZADEGAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY NETWORK
Iran-based Azadegan Transportation Company is an IRGC-affiliated company critical to the logistics operations of the IRGC. As of 2018, Azadegan Transportation Company was part of the portfolio of companies owned, controlled, or directed by U.S.-designated Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation. Azadegan Transportation Company conducts ground cargo transportation operations for the IRGC, including the transportation of lethal aid in the Middle East and providing logistical services related to ammunition for IRGC facilities.
Iran-based Amad Behineh Saz Engineering Company (Amad Behineh Saz), Sanjesh Gostar Dana Engineering and Quality Control Inspection Company (Sanjesh Gostar Dana), and Talieh Sabz Jehan Group Company (Talieh Sabz Jehan) are legal entities that are members of the board of directors of Azadegan Transportation Company. Amad Behineh Saz is an IRGC-affiliated company responsible for the design and production of mechanical and electronic parts and is represented on Azadegan Transportation Company’s board by Ali Zare (Zare), who also acts as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Azadegan Transportation Company. Sanjesh Gostar Dana is an IRGC-affiliated company responsible for quality inspection and supervision, and is represented on Azadegan Transportation Company’s board by Gholamreza Eini Sarkalleh (Sarkalleh), who also acts as the Vice Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Azadegan Transportation Company. Talieh Sabz Jehan is an IRGC-affiliated company responsible for providing design and project management guidance, and is represented on Azadegan Transportation Company’s board by Masoud Noorahmadi (Noorahmadi), who also acts as the Managing Director of Azadegan Transportation Company.
Azadegan Transportation Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, the IRGC. Amad Behineh Saz and Talieh Sabz Jehan are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Azadegan Transportation Company. Zare, Sarkalleh, and Noorahmadi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Azadegan Transportation Company. Sanjesh Gostar Dana is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or providing financial, materiel or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC.
FARZANEGAN PROPULSION SYSTEMS DESIGN BUREAU AND COMPANY OFFICIALS
Iran-based Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau (Farzanegan) has supplied Russian weapons makers with samples of Farzanegan’s engines in support of Russian cruise missile development. Farzanegan manufactures numerous types of engines, including turbojet engines, and claims to have designed Iran’s first ramjet engine. Farzanegan has long been involved in the development of engine technology for Iranian defense research entities, and Farzanegan’s engines have been presented in person to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Hossein Pourfarzaneh, Zahra Pourfarzaneh, and Hassan Pourfarzaneh are leaders or officials of Farzanegan, with Hossein Pourfarzaneh taking a public-facing and highly publicized role as the lead engineer at Farzanegan.
Farzanegan is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. Hossein Pourfarzaneh, Zahra Pourfarzaneh, and Hassan Pourfarzaneh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of Farzanegan.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the persons above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as from engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. sanctions, including the factors that OFAC generally considers when determining an appropriate response to an apparent violation.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. sanctions. For additional guidance specific to E.O. 14024, as amended, please see the updated OFAC advisory, “Updated Guidance for Foreign Financial Institutions on OFAC Sanctions Authorities Targeting Support to Russia’s Military-Industrial Base,” as well as OFAC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 1146–1157. For additional guidance specific to Iran authorities, please refer to OFAC’s Iran Sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.
State Department
Fact sheet released on Sept. 10, 2024:
The Department of State is taking action today to constrain further Iran’s destabilizing activities, including its transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia, a serious escalation in its support for Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine. The expanding military partnership between Iran and Russia threatens European security and illustrates how Iran’s destabilizing influence reaches beyond the Middle East to undermine security around the world. The United States will continue to use all tools at our disposal to disrupt and counter Iran’s weapons exports, with particular attention to transfers that support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Today’s sanctions actions build on previous Department of State designations of entities and individuals facilitating Iran-Russia cooperation, including in February 2024, October 2023, May 2023, December 2022.
The Department is designating IRAN AIR pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13949 for materially contributing to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.
- Iranian proliferators use IRAN AIR to facilitate procurement of sensitive western-origin goods on behalf of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its expeditionary Qods Force (QF) through direct Europe to Iran routes.
- IRAN AIR has transported on numerous occasions proliferation –sensitive materiel to the IRGC QF unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) program.
- IRAN AIR constitutes a key element of Iran’s illicit proliferation network enabling Iran’s acquisition of sensitive-western origin dual-use materials for use in the development of UAVs, some of which are provided to Russia for use in Ukraine.
The Department is designating two Russia-based shipping companies pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- VAFA WHOLESALE LTD owns vessels that have transported Iranian UAV-related equipment from Iran to Russia via the Caspian Sea.
The following two vessels are being identified as property in which VAFA WHOLESALE LTD has an interest:
- VAFA (IMO 8422670).
- VAFA-1 (IMO 8422682).
- SEA RIVER SERVICE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY owns vessels that have transported munitions from Iran to Russia via the Caspian Sea for use against Ukraine.
The following three vessels are being identified as property in which SEA RIVER SERVICE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY has an interest:
- OMSKIY-103 (IMO 8889385). As additional information, OMSKIY-103 transported munitions from Iran to Russia via the Caspian Sea in February 2024.
- OMSKIY-119 (IMO 8926913).
- ZAKAMSK (IMO 8951413).
Sanctions Implications
As a result of today’s action, and in accordance with E.O.s 13949 and 14024, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all individuals or entities that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Additionally, the entry of designated individuals into the United States is suspended pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 8693.
Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany
Joint statement on Sept. 10, 2024: “The governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom strongly condemn Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles. This is a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and will see Iranian missiles reaching European soil, increasing the suffering of the Ukrainian people. This act is an escalation by both Iran and Russia, and is a direct threat to European security.
“The E3 has privately and publicly been clear that we would take new and significant measures against Iran if the transfers took place. We now have confirmation that Iran has made these transfers. We will be taking immediate steps to cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran. In addition, we will pursue the designations of significant entities and individuals involved with Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the transfer of ballistic missiles and other weapons to Russia. We will also work towards imposing sanctions on Iran Air.
The E3 are closely coordinating our strong response to these transfers with our European and international partners. We call on Iran to immediately cease all support to Russia’s war against Ukraine and halt the development and transfers of its ballistic missiles."
G7 Foreign Ministers
Joint statement on Sept. 14, 2024: “We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the EU, condemn in the strongest possible terms Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles.
“Evidence that Iran has continued to transfer weaponry to Russia despite repeated international calls to stop represents a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia has used Iranian weaponry such as UAVs to kill Ukrainian civilians and strike their critical infrastructure. Russia’s aggression constitutes a flagrant violation of international law including the UN Charter.
“Iran must immediately cease all support to Russia’s illegal and unjustifiable war against Ukraine and halt such transfers of ballistic missiles, UAVs and related technology, which constitute a direct threat to the Ukrainian people as well as European and international security more broadly.
“We remain steadfast in our commitment to hold Iran to account for its unacceptable support for Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine that further undermines global security. In line with our previous statements on the matter, we are already responding with new and significant measures."