On Dec. 1, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman and Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The following are two excerpts, with links to their full statements below.
Wendy Sherman
American policy regarding Iran is clear: First and foremost, we are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran’s illicit nuclear activity is one of the greatest global concerns we face. Since this Administration took office, we have built and led a global coalition to create the toughest, most comprehensive set of sanctions to date on the Iranian regime. President Ahmadinejad himself recently characterized our sanctions as ―the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history…
Our policy has been effective: in January 2009, Iran appeared internally united and regionally influential, while the international community was divided on how to address Iran’s nuclear activities. Today, after three years of increasing international pressure, the regime is regionally isolated, and the international community is united in its determination to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. This reversal is due in part to the measures taken by the United States and our allies to exact steep costs on Iran and its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. By refusing our offer to engage, Iran has demonstrated that it is responsible for our current impasse, and we have mobilized broad support to hold Tehran accountable for its deceptive behavior.
Just ten days ago, we intensified the pressure on Iran in three ways: The President signed an Executive Order targeting the development of Iran’s petroleum resources and maintenance or expansion of its petrochemical industry. Second, State and Treasury designated 11 individuals and entities for facilitating Iran’s proliferation activities, including four entities identified by State as key nodes in Iranian missile and nuclear procurement networks. This action brings the total to over 280 designations under Executive Order13382. Finally, the Administration identified Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This finding makes clear that doing business with any part of the Iranian financial sector, including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, and subsidiaries operating outside Iran, risks doing business with a financial system that shelters money launderers and terrorists…
The key to this and all we have done over the last two and a half years is that we are not alone. The same day that we announced our measures, the UK and Canada adopted similar sanctions to isolate Iran’s financial sector. Today, the European Union will meet to formalize additional sanctions on roughly 200 individuals linked to Iran’s proliferation activities. On November 18, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors responded to the latest Director General’s report by passing a resolution urging Iran to come clean about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program. The United States rallied the P5+1 members to co-sponsor the resolution, which was adopted overwhelmingly and sent the message that Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. On that same day, the UN General Assembly sent its own message by adopting Saudi Arabia’s resolution condemning the assassination plot against its Ambassador to the United States.
Co-sponsored by more than a fourth of all UN Member States, the resolution condemned attacks against diplomats and called on Iran to comply with its international obligations. As we learned from cases around the world, sanctions are most effective when they are multilateral, and that is what we have seen with Iran as well.
All of this is taking place in the context of global transition. Europe is concerned about its economic situation and the vision of a united continent. Among the P5+1, Russia has parliamentary elections in December and presidential elections in March, with Prime Minister Putin expected to return to the presidential office. France has Presidential elections later in the spring. China is looking inward as it manages its own succession politics. Meanwhile, governments in the region continue to have grave concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions: not only Israel, but also Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states watch with intensity what Iran does and what we do in response. These factors pull in often divergent directions regarding our approach to Iran, but we continue to coordinate robust actions with our partners to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
It is clear that, as a result of the measures we have already taken in lock step with the international community, the Iranian regime feels isolated and vulnerable, not emboldened. This is true, not just in the case of our European allies but in Iran’s own backyard. Iran has failed to co-opt the Arab uprisings, despite its efforts to take advantage of them, and alienated itself by supporting Bashar al-Asad’s brutal repression of Syrian citizens. While we, the Arab League, Turkey, the EU, and others support the legitimate demands of the Syrian people, Iran occupies a lonely and indefensible position as Asad’s ally. The burning of Iranian flags in the streets confirms that Syrians know Iran is not on their side.
For the full statement, click here.
David Cohen
In implementing the pressure strategy, Treasury has focused on developing sanctions actions that expose the Iranian government’s involvement in a broad range of illicit conduct, including nuclear and missile proliferation, support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and deceptive financial conduct and evasion of international sanctions. Our actions in recent months illustrate that such illicit conduct is indeed pervasive in multiple Iranian government sectors – including Iran’s government-owned banks, its government-operated transportation infrastructure, and the IRGC, a branch of Iran’s military. Examples of recent actions targeting Iranian illicit conduct include:
• Abuse of the Global Financial System. Treasury actions targeting Iranian banks are intended to prevent those banks from using the international financial system to facilitate Iran’s proliferation activity or terrorism support, or from assisting other banks or entities in evading U.S. or international sanctions. We continued these efforts in May by designating Iran’s Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM) under E.O. 13382 for providing financial services for other designated Iranian banks. BIM is the 22nd Iranian-state owned financial institution to be designated by Treasury in the last five years.
• Use of Transportation Infrastructure to Facilitate Illicit Conduct. Our actions against key elements of Iran’s transportation infrastructure are aimed at impeding Iran’s use of ships, airlines and ports for its proliferation-related or terrorism support activities. This year, we designated Tidewater Middle East Co. (Tidewater), an IRGC-owned port operating company that manages the main container terminal at Bandar Abbas and has operations at six other Iranian ports. We imposed sanctions against Iran Air, the Iranian national airline carrier and its largest airline, because it has been used by the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to transport military-related equipment. We also designated the second largest airline in Iran, Iranian commercial airline Mahan Air, for providing financial, material, and technological support to the IRGC-Qods Force. We sanctioned 46 companies and individuals affiliated with Iran’s national maritime carrier, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, which is subject to U.S. and international sanctions, and three individuals who each play a key role in aiding IRISL’s sanctions evasion activities worldwide.
• Human Rights Abuses. As the Iranian regime’s abuse of its citizens’ human rights has continued, Treasury, working with State, has imposed sanctions against 11 senior Iranian officials and three Iranian entities — the IRGC, the Basij Resistance Force, and Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) — including the IRGC’s commander, the LEF chief, and Iran’s Intelligence Minister. Under an authority that targets those responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses in Syria, Treasury designated the LEF for supporting the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate in its brutal suppression of the Syrian people. Treasury also designated LEF’s Chief and Deputy Chief, and two senior IRGC-Qods Force officers, including IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani for supporting the brutal suppression of the Syrian people orchestrated by the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate.
• Support for Terrorism. We designated six members of an al-Qa’ida facilitation network operating in Iran under an agreement with the Iranian government, thereby degrading this network’s ability to function while exposing Iran’s continued support for terrorism worldwide. Treasury also sanctioned five individuals, including four senior IRGC-QF officers – among them the previously designated IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani -- connected to a plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir and carry out follow-on attacks against other countries’ interests inside the United States and in another country.
• Proliferation-related Activities. On November 21, the State Department and Treasury designated 10 entities and one individual for their links to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the main Iranian organization responsible for research and development activities in the field of nuclear technology, including Iran's centrifuge enrichment program and experimental laser enrichment of uranium program…
As we explore opportunities to increase pressure on Iran, we are keenly focused — as is the Congress — on applying additional sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. So we welcome French President Sarkozy’s suggestion last week for a multilateral asset freeze on the CBI, as we recognize that coordinated and focused action against the CBI could have a particularly powerful impact on Iran’s access to the international financial system and its ability to access the hard currency it earns from oil sales. And we welcome the opportunity to continue to work with Congress on an effective, well-designed and well-targeted sanction against the CBI. As we prepare these steps, it is imperative that we act in a way that does not threaten to fracture the international coalition of nations committed to the dual-track approach, does not inadvertently redound to Iran’s economic benefit, and brings real and meaningful pressure to bear on Iran.
It is also important to remember that delivering potent pressure on Iran is not wholly dependent on how we address the Central Bank. Put simply, a designation of the CBI is not the only step, nor would it be the last step, available to bring consequential pressure to bear on Iran. For example, as more and more countries and foreign banks refuse to deal with designated Iranian banks, we remain keenly focused on the possibility that non-designated Iranian financial institutions may become involved in proliferation activity or terrorist financing.
For the full statement, click here.