On Nov. 21, 2024, the U.N. nuclear watchdog’s 35-member board of governors censured Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the agency. Britain, France and Germany – the so-called E3 – sponsored the resolution, which was also backed by the United States. The closed-door vote was:
- 19 countries were in favor
- China, Russia and Burkina Faso opposed
- 12 countries abstained
- Venezuela reportedly did not vote
The resolution, the second in five months, reflected frustration among Western powers with Iran’s stonewalling of a long-running International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation. Rather than responding with positive action to the June 2024 censure, Iran “has once again decided to respond with threats and provocations, while continuing with its strategy of delay and obfuscation on the long list of outstanding safeguards questions,” the E3 and the United States said in a joint statement. U.S. Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate said that Tehran should provide “full transparency” if it is “interested in demonstrating the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.”
The board of governors called on Iran to provide “technically credible explanations” for traces of uranium at undeclared sites. Iran is required to declare all nuclear material and sites under its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement. The probe, which dates back to at least 2019, initially covered three undeclared locations. Questions about two, Turquzabad and Varamin, remained outstanding as of November 2024. The suspicious activity took place before 2003, when Iran halted its nuclear weapons program.
The resolution also required the IAEA “to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.”
The vote followed a visit to Iran by IAEA chief Rafeal Grossi the previous week that appeared to be productive. Iran acquiesced to the IAEA demand to stop enriching uranium to 60 percent, just a technical step away from weapons-grade purity.
Iran’s response to the new censure, however, threatened to undermine any potential progress. Even before the IAEA board vote, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that another resolution would “complicate” potential nuclear talks. Officials claimed that the Europeans and Americans pushed the resolution through due to “political motivations.” On November 22, Mohammad Eslami, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, issued directives to initiate the operation of a “substantial number of advanced centrifuges of various models.” Centrifuges are cylindrical machines that spin uranium gas at high speeds to produce fuel for nuclear reactors or weapons.
T
ensions between Iran and the IAEA have been building for several years. In May 2018, President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran began breaching the deal’s limits in July 2019. The initial advances were incremental and calibrated, but the pace increased after Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the father of Iran’s nuclear program, was assassinated in November 2020. Parliament passed a law that called for the suspension of inspections required under the Additional Protocol, which expands IAEA access to Iranian facilities, and other limits under the 2015 nuclear. In 2021, the Biden administration launched new diplomacy to restore both Iranian and U.S. compliance with the JCPOA, but Iran ultimately rejected a draft deal in 2022.
By late 2024, Iran had acquired enough enriched uranium to produce several nuclear weapons if it made the political decision to do so. It could enrich enough uranium to fuel one nuclear weapon in two weeks or less, but it would likely need several months or more than a year to build a warhead and marry it to a delivery system, such as a ballistic missile. The following is the full text of the resolution with statements by the IAEA, Iran and major world powers.
NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran
Resolution adopted on 21 November 2024 during the 1746th session
The Board of Governors,
(a) Commending the continued professional, independent and impartial efforts of the IAEA
Director General and the Secretariat, including its inspectors, to implement Iran’s NPT
Safeguards Agreement,
(b) Emphasizing the essential and independent role of the IAEA in verifying Iran’s compliance with its NPT-required safeguards obligations,
(c) Stressing the importance of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations and the need for Iran to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the Agency with a view to clarifying and resolving the long outstanding safeguards issues detailed in the Director General’s report GOV/2024/62 and in several prior reports,
(d) Noting the Director General’s deep concern that undeclared nuclear material had been
present at several undeclared locations in Iran and that its current location(s) are not known to the Agency, and his assessment that nuclear material used in Iran was not declared as required under Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement,
(e) Recalling Iran’s continued failure to implement modified Code 3.1, contrary to the legal obligations that it had accepted in 2003 and which it cannot modify or suspend unilaterally, and Iran’s failure to provide the Agency with design and preliminary design information regarding new and planned nuclear facilities, as required under modified Code 3.1,
(f) Noting the Director General’s conclusion that the material balance of the uranium involved in undeclared uranium metal production experiments conducted at JHL in 1995-2000 includes an amount of nuclear material unaccounted for,
(g) Recalling the Board of Governors’ resolutions of 19 June 2020 contained in GOV/2020/34, of 8 June 2022 contained in GOV/2022/34, and of 17 November 2022 contained in GOV/2022/70 which called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and decided that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding issues, take all specified actions without delay,
(h) Recalling the most recent Board of Governors’ resolution of 5 June 2024 contained in GOV/2024/39 which considered that a continued failure by Iran to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous co-operation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, may necessitate the production, by the Director General, of a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program,
(i) Deeply regretting that despite the above resolutions by the Board and many opportunities provided by the Director General over five years, Iran has neither provided the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran nor informed the Agency of the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment, and that instead stated it has declared all of the nuclear material and activities required under its safeguards Agreement, which is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings,
(j) Noting that, notwithstanding Iran’s statements, the Agency has not changed its assessment of the undeclared nuclear-related activities that took place at four undeclared locations in Iran, nor of the origin of the uranium particles of anthropogenic origin, (k) Underscoring the Director General’s conclusion that unless and until Iran provides technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations and informs the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or contaminated equipment, the Agency cannot confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, (l) Noting with serious concern the Director General’s conclusion that these issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful, (m) Supporting the Director General’s ongoing efforts, including through the high level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran on 14 November 2024, to obtain progress from Iran on resolving outstanding safeguards issues and improving cooperation with the Agency, including through the full implementation of the Joint statement between the IAEA and Iran of 4 March 2023, recalling that both sides have recognised that such engagements could pave the way for wider agreements among parties,
1. Strongly supports the Agency’s continued efforts to implement Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, with the aim to provide assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
2. Reiterates its profound concern that Iran has still not provided necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency and has not taken the essential and urgent actions as decided by the Board in its June 2024 resolution, with the consequence that safeguards issues remain outstanding despite numerous interactions with the Agency since 2019, with serious implications for the Agency’s ability to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
3. Underscores Iran’s obligation to implement modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation, and provide all necessary design and preliminary design information to the Agency;
4. Reaffirms its decision that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding safeguards issues, take the following actions without delay:
i. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran,
ii. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,
iii. Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose,
iv. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.
5. Underlines that the provision by Iran of this information and access and the subsequent verification by the IAEA pursuant to Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement is essential for the Secretariat to be in position to report the issues as no longer outstanding and thereby remove the need for the Board’s consideration and action on these issues;
6. Requests the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, including a full account of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA on these issues, addressing the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations including the non-diversion of nuclear material, based on all information available, for consideration by the March 2025 Board of Governors or at the latest by spring 2025;
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Britain, France, Germany and the United States
Amb. Corinne Kitsell on Nov. 21, 2024: “I have the honour to speak on behalf of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
“We thank the Director General for his latest report and for the Agency’s continued attempts to clarify the outstanding issues related to the implementation of Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement. These issues are central to understanding the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably and despite countless opportunities over many years, Iran has failed to provide the technically credible information needed to resolve them. We are deeply concerned that as a result of these outstanding issues, the Agency is unable to assure us that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
“We also recall the previous resolutions adopted by this Board. They provided a consistent and clear call to urge Iran to resolve these matters. The last resolution adopted by the Board in June was just the latest opportunity for Iran to take meaningful steps to comply with its legal safeguards obligations. Unfortunately, almost six months later, rather than responding with positive action, Iran has once again decided to respond with threats and provocations, while continuing with its strategy of delay and obfuscation on the long list of outstanding safeguards questions.
“The Director General’s latest report makes clear that Iran is still not cooperating substantively on the safeguards issues. Iran’s record on safeguards is the core issue that is under consideration under this Board item. We should be clear that outstanding issues can only be resolved by Iran’s cooperation on those issues.
“Since 2019, the Agency has sought to clarify the outstanding safeguards issues and make progress. For nearly five years now, Iran has consistently failed to implement the commitments it has made to the Agency. This includes commitments Iran made in the March 2023 Joint Statement. But we must also recall that Iran failed to implement the Joint Statements of 5 March 2022, 15 December 2021, 12 September 2021, and 26 August 2020, as well. While these statements represented genuine and creative efforts by the Agency to make progress, the promises contained in them have never been fulfilled by Iran. We must also remember that Iran does not need such additional frameworks to co-operate with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues. Such a framework already exists: the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement Iran signed and ratified, and the legally binding obligations it contains. Further commitments by Iran to continue discussions on these issues in the future, that are not backed up by concrete action, after years of delay and denial, are not sufficient. Words need to be matched by deeds.
“Chair,
We are deeply concerned that due to Iran’s failure to resolve these issues to date, the Agency cannot provide assurance that Iran’s programme remains exclusively peaceful. The IAEA’s ability to provide this assurance is central to the integrity of the safeguards system and global non-proliferation regime. As we have said, the outstanding issues and the issue of discrepancy in Iran are not historical – they are active concerns. Resolving them is key to the Agency’s ability to verify the implementation of safeguards in Iran today. This is especially true at a time when Iranian officials are resorting to dangerous rhetoric concerning Iran’s so-called nuclear doctrine and about its claimed capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon.
“Iran’s decision not to provide the required information has made it necessary for France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States to jointly propose to the Board the new resolution contained in document GOV/2024/66 to support the Secretariat’s effort to resolve these matters.
“Our draft resolution contains the following main points:
“First, the Board would express continued, strong support for the Agency’s professional and impartial efforts in carrying out its mandate to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations.
Second, the Board would reiterate its concern that Iran has still not provided necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency and has not made progress towards the actions in the Board’s June 2024 resolution. It would reaffirm the Board’s decision, in accordance with Article 18 of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, that it is essential and urgent, that Iran fulfil its legal obligations and take the specific actions called for by the Director General without delay.
“And third, the Board would follow its June 2024 resolution which set out that Iran’s continued failure to resolve these issues may necessitate the production of a comprehensive report. This resolution would request the Director General to produce such a comprehensive and updated assessment, including a full account of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, addressing the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations, including the non-diversion of nuclear material, for consideration by the March 2025 Board of Governors or at the latest by spring 2025.
“Chair,
“Iran has not shown any meaningful progress on the outstanding safeguards issues for over five years. So it is important for the Board to be provided a clear and updated assessment of all information available, allowing for consideration of whether further steps are necessary, including potentially making a finding under Article 19 of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.
“Chair,
“Our objective is to uphold the integrity of IAEA safeguards and the non-proliferation regime. We strongly believe this Board must not, and will not, be intimidated by threats from Iran, or others who echo those threats, that mischaracterise the objective of the proposed resolution. Our ultimate aim – and this is a key point – is to foster progress. As the resolution sets out, Iran’s cooperation with the Agency will be reflected in the requested assessment. This comprehensive assessment could therefore include positive and meaningful progress on outstanding issues in the coming months. This resolution is a further opportunity for Iran to provide the technically credible information and substantive cooperation needed to inform the Agency’s reports and therefore the next steps on these issues.
“Chair,
“We have always been clear that if Iran meaningfully cooperates with the Agency, and the Director General is able to report that the unresolved safeguards issues are no longer outstanding, the Board will no longer need to consider this item. We sincerely hope Iran takes this opportunity to meaningfully cooperate with the DG to resolve these outstanding matters so that no further Board action is necessary.
“Chair,
“Iran has argued that any Board action under this item may undermine efforts to return to a diplomatic solution. We would reiterate that it is Iran that is seeking to politicise its safeguards obligations, which cannot be subject to negotiations. Those safeguards obligations are to produce assurances that can only be established via Iran’s implementation of – not discussion about – the necessary safeguards cooperation. The Board’s responsibility is to uphold the safeguards regime. By supporting this resolution, the Board underscores its absolute support for the Agency’s role within that regime.
“Chair,
“Our delegations have engaged broadly with Board members to explain our thinking, solicit their feedback, and listen to their views on these matters. We thank those that have already indicated support for this resolution, and request the text be made public, should it be adopted.”
Britain, France and Germany
Nov. 21, 2024: “On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank Director-General Grossi for his latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme.
“As always, we commend the Agency’s professional, independent and impartial work and their objective reporting. Unfortunately, the Agency’s findings are, once again, highly concerning.
“Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile has further expanded over the current reporting period. Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 %. It now has well over four IAEA significant quantities of uranium enriched up 60%, which the IAEA defines as the approximate amount of nuclear material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Its overall stockpile of enriched uranium is now over 32 times the limit Iran committed to in the JCPoA.
“Over the past five months, Iran has also substantially expanded its overall production capacity by installing and operating new advanced centrifuges; in the reporting period, it has installed six additional cascades of advanced centrifuges at Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz, thus further enhancing its enrichment capacity.
“Iran continues obstructing the work of the IAEA, which has had detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to effectively verify and monitor Iran’s nuclear programme and to provide assurance of the programme’s exclusively peaceful nature:
“As a result of this lack of transparency, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate, as the DG reiterates in his report.
“In addition, Iran is upholding its politically motivated de-designation of several experienced Agency inspectors, which seriously affects the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification in Iran, particularly at the enrichment facilities. Iran has now offered to consider “the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors”. Even if that consideration becomes a reality, it will still not fully compensate the loss of Agency expertise in this field.
“The DG’s report also notes that it has been more than three years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol, depriving the Agency of complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran.
“Chair,
“In his latest report, the DG references discussions about Iran halting expanding its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60%. If Iran were to stop enriching uranium up to 60%, this would constitute a step that is long overdue. Enrichment to such levels not only is a blatant violation of Iran’s commitments under the JCPoA; but, as the DG again states in his report, Iran is the only state without nuclear weapons in the world to do so. We should also remain vigilant that even if Iran were to proceed with this measure, Iran would still retain an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60% at any point. We therefore call on Iran to not only offer halting high-level enrichment but to immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.
“Chair,
“Let us be clear: Iran’s choices and decisions regarding its nuclear activities are the source of this long-standing proliferation crisis. It is Iran that has escalated this situation by further departing from its JCPoA commitments. We therefore urge Iran to:
1. Halt and reverse its nuclear escalation and refrain from making threats to produce nuclear weapons;
2. Return to the limits imposed by the JCPoA, in particular those regarding enrichment;
3. Implement the Iran-IAEA March 2023 Joint statement and the commitments it made regarding transparency and cooperation with the IAEA including re-applying all transparency measures that it stopped in February 2021;
4. Allow the Agency to install surveillance and monitoring equipment where requested;
5. Re-implement and swiftly ratify its Additional Protocol; and
6. Fully reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw the designations of experienced inspectors.
“Chair,
“Iran’s behaviour in the nuclear realm is a threat to international security and undermines the global non-proliferation system. We recall that in 2022, Iran twice refused a negotiated outcome and instead chose to escalate and expand its nuclear programme to alarming levels. The international community must remain firm in its determination to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and we stand ready to use all diplomatic levers to achieve this goal.
“The latest statements, including by high-ranking officials, about Iran’s purported technical capability to produce nuclear weapons and the possibility of changing its so-called nuclear doctrine are contrary to Iran’s commitments under the JCPoA and its preamble and are incompatible with Iran’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT.
“We ask the Director General to keep the Board of Governors informed on the status of Iran’s nuclear programme by periodical and, if deemed necessary, extraordinary reporting. We ask for this report to be made public."
United States
Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate on Nov. 21, 2024: “The United States extends its appreciation to the Director General for his November 19 report on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231. We thank the Secretariat for its continued dedication and professionalism in implementing the Agency’s critical JCPOA-related responsibilities in Iran and we are grateful for the Director General’s ongoing personal engagement to address the international community’s longstanding concerns with Iran’s nuclear program.
“Chair,
“The Director General’s latest report contains new developments that warrant close attention, and, to put it simply, Iran’s nuclear activities during this reporting period remained deeply troubling overall. As the report makes clear, Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, to install additional advanced centrifuge cascades, and to accumulate greater quantities of highly enriched uranium.
“Iran has already amassed a substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium for which it has no credible peaceful purpose. As Iranian officials have themselves noted, the only other states enriching uranium up to 60 percent are those with nuclear weapons. If Iran is truly interested in building confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, it should not only stop further production of 60 percent enriched uranium, but also downblend its 60 percent stockpile entirely.
“In addition, we deeply regret that Iran continues to stonewall the Agency on longstanding safeguards concerns and refuses to implement its legal obligations under modified Code 3.1. As we have made clear, and as we encourage all Board Members to clearly affirm, Iran must implement its legal safeguards obligations in full and without further delay. If Iran is interested in demonstrating the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program, it should do much more than take easily reversible steps. It should provide greater assurance, including resuming implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provide full transparency regarding centrifuge component production.
“Chair,
“We again note with concern that Iran’s politically motivated decision last year to de-designate experienced Agency inspectors has seriously affected the Agency’s verification activities. These actions were deeply counterproductive. In this regard, we note the DG’s report that Iran has agreed to consider, at the Director General’s request, the acceptance of four additional experienced inspectors. We hope this consideration results in their formal acceptance.
“We recall that Iran’s de-designation of experienced inspectors began last year following Iran’s undeclared modification of advanced centrifuge cascades at its underground Fordow facility, in violation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, and the Agency’s detection there of uranium particles enriched to more than 80 percent. Such actions intensified tensions and pushed unprecedented boundaries.
“In this context, Iran’s level of cooperation with the Agency remains far short of the expectations outlined by the Director General and the Board. While steps in the right direction in terms of engagement with the Director General and his team would be welcome, if Iran hopes to build meaningful confidence moving forward, Iran must fulfill entirely its safeguards obligations and enable the Agency to provide assurance that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
“Chair,
“With these comments, the United States takes note of the DG’s report in document GOV/2024/61 and requests it be made public. Thank you.”
Iran
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
Nov. 22, 2024: “In the final hours of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 21 November 2024, a non-consensus resolution regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear program was adopted under the pressure and insistence of three European countries and the United States, despite lacking the support of approximately half of the Member States.
“The principled policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently been to engage constructively with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the framework of rights and obligations enshrined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
From its inception, the Fourteenth Administration has prioritized the continuation and enhancement of cooperation with the IAEA with the objective of resolving outstanding issues.
“In line with this approach, Iran welcomed the recent visit of the IAEA Director General to Tehran, ensuring all necessary preparations to foster constructive engagement and the success of the visit.
“During the visit, the Director General held high-level meetings with senior officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran and inspected the Martyr Dr. Ali Mohammadi and Martyr Engineer Ahmadi-Roshan enrichment facilities. These discussions provided a strong foundation for furthering constructive interactions between Iran and the IAEA.
“In this context, the actions of the three European nations and the United States—countries with a documented history of reneging on their commitments, including under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and resorting to unlawful sanctions and pressures against the Iranian nation—are both confrontational and unjustifiable. Rather than fostering the constructive atmosphere established during the Director General’s visit, they prematurely proposed a politically motivated resolution against Iran, disregarding the promising trajectory of Iran-IAEA cooperation. The failure of this resolution to gain the support of half the Board members reflects the disapproval of many states regarding the divisive and political agenda pursued by its sponsors.
“This politicized and destructive measure undermines the positive momentum achieved between Iran and the Agency and blatantly contradicts the professed commitment of the three European nations and the United States to preserving the integrity and impartiality of the IAEA. It lays bare their use of the nuclear issue as a pretext to advance illegitimate objectives.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently emphasized, at all levels, that taking confrontational measures and any misuse of the IAEA Board of Governors to pursue political and illegitimate objectives would elicit a reciprocal response. The details of Iran’s potential course of action had already been communicated to the Director General in advance.
“In alignment with this position, the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has issued directives to initiate the operation of a substantial number of advanced centrifuges of various models.
“Undertaken to safeguard Iran’s national interests, these measures aim to further develop the country’s peaceful nuclear program to address its growing national needs, all within the framework of Iran’s rights and obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
“Notwithstanding this firm response, Iran reaffirms that its technical and safeguards-related cooperation with the IAEA will continue as before, strictly in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement.
“In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its readiness to engage constructively with all relevant stakeholders based on international legal principles and norms. Iran remains steadfast in its commitment to uphold the rights and interests of its great nation while resolutely advancing its peaceful and indigenous nuclear program.”
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Iran to the IAEA Mohsen Naziri Asl
Nov. 21, 2024: "Regrettably, there are political motivations behind this resolution. Its sponsors, disregarding the recent visit of the IAEA Director General to Tehran, have sought to pass it with political intent.
"It was evident that there was insufficient support, as the low number of votes in favor demonstrates that members considered this resolution neither timely nor technically justified," he said.
“It is unfortunate that the sponsors are using this platform for political purposes. In this regard, Iran is collaborating with other countries to ensure that the IAEA's integrity is not compromised and that the agency's technical work, especially the actions undertaken by the Director General, continues on the correct path and within the framework of the objectives approved in the statute.
"Our actions are within our legitimate and legal rights, and we need to see how we can move forward with the agency in light of recent developments.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
Nov. 21, 2024: “This inappropriate action of the three European countries to issue a resolution against Iran will only weaken and disrupt interactive processes between the agency and Iran.”
Nov. 20, 2024: “This move by the E3 is in clear confrontation with the positive atmosphere created in engagements between Iran and the IAEA, and will only make the issue more complicated.”
Nov. 20, 2024: “If the opposing parties disregard Iran's goodwill and interactive approach and place unconstructive measures on the agenda of the Board of Governors meeting by passing a resolution, Iran will respond appropriately and proportionately.”
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi
Nov. 20, 2024: “Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
Following my last report, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20% and up to 60% U-235 continued to increase.
“However, during the high-level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran on 14 November 2024, the possibility of Iran not further expanding its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 was discussed, including technical verification measures necessary for the Agency to confirm this, if implemented. On 16 November 2024, the Agency verified at Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and at Fuel Enrichment Plant that Iran had begun implementation of preparatory measures aimed at stopping the increase of its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. Exchanges between the Agency and Iran on this matter are expected to continue.
“It has been almost three years and nine months since Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and therefore it is also over three and a half years since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access in Iran. Consequently, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.
“You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran says it has declared all nuclear material, activities and locations required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. However, this statement is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran. The Agency needs to know the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment involved. Iran still is not implementing modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran, having stated it had suspended such implementation. These outstanding safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be able to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
“During my high-level meetings in Tehran, substantive discussions of the issues covered by the Joint Statement agreed in March 2023 continued, including in particular on the issue related to the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance and possible elements to address Varamin.
“During our meeting, Iran agreed to respond to the Agency’s concerns related to Iran’s withdrawal of the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors by considering the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors, a decision I welcome.”