On March 20, the U.N. nuclear watchdog released a new report detailing Iran’s implementation of the interim nuclear deal brokered in November 2013. Tehran has continued to comply with the agreement and has not enriched uranium to 20 percent. But it has not yet completed a facility to convert low-enriched uranium gas into an oxide, which would need to be reprocessed to be used to fuel a weapon. The following is an analysis by the Arms Control Association on Iran’s implementation with a link to the latest U.N. report.
Iranian Actions | Status |
By January 20, halt production of near-20% enriched uranium hexaflouride gas (UF6) and commit to only enrich up to 5%. | Completed According to the January 20 IAEA report, Iran had halted enrichment to 20% UF6. |
By January 20, disable the configuration of the centrifuge cascades Iran has been using to produce 20% enriched UF6. | Completed According to the January 20 IAEA report, Iran had ceased operating its interconnected centrifuges enriching to 20% UF6. The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran is now using the four cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to 5%. |
On January 20, continue conversion of half of its stockpile of near-20% uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) into uranium oxide powder as working stock for fabricating fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. | In Progress According to the February 20 IAEA report, Iran is in the process of converting half of its stockpile of 20% enriched UF6 gas to uranium oxide powder. An additional 49 kg were converted since the November IAEA report. |
On January 20, begin dilution of half of its stockpile of 20% UF6 to no more than 5% enriched UF6 and complete dilution by April 20. | In Progress According to remarks delievered to the IAEA Board of Governors on March 3, Iran completed dilution of half of its required dilution of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%. |
Continue only its safeguarded research and development practices, including its current enrichment reserach practices, which were not designated for accumulation of the enriched uranium. | Completed In the February 20 IAEA report, the agency verified that Iran was continuing its safeguarded research and development practices at Natanz and was not using the research to accumulate uranium as it tested advanced models. |
By April 20, provide the IAEA with: | |
| In Progress Iran submited details on site selection for 16 nuclear power plants to the IAEA, its initial plans for 10 future enrichment sites, and a light water reactor. |
| Not Yet Completed |
| Not Yet Completed |
| In Progress According to the February 20 IAEA report, the agency has received some infomation about Iran's mining and milling activities, and more will be forthcoming. |
| Not Yet Completed |
Submit an updated Design Information Questionaire (DIQ) for the reactor at Arak (IR-40). | Completed Iran submitted at updated DIQ on the reactor to the IAEA on February 12, according to the agency's Feb. 20 report. |
Take steps to conclude a safeguards approach with the IAEA for the Arak reactor. | In Progress The IAEA's February 20 report notes that Iran agreed to take steps to work with the agency to conclude the safeguards agreement. |
Allow daily IAEA inspector access at Fordow and Nantanz, including scheduled and unannounced inspections and access to surveillance information on a daily basis. | Completed As of the February 20 IAEA report, the IAEA was able to install surveillance measures at Natanz and Fordow to facilitate daily monitoring and came to an agreement regarding the facilitation of daily access. (Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA had acessed Fordow on a weekly basis, and Natanz on a biweekly basis.) |
Allow the IAEA to conduct monthly inspections of the heavy water reactor at Arak and associated facilities. | In Progress The IAEA was able to make its first monthly visit and access the heavy water reactor on Feb. 12, according to the agency's Feb. 20 IAEA report. (Prior inspections were conducted at the reactor once every three months, and other facilities at the site were not included.) |
Provide information to allow the IAEA inspectors managed access to: | |
| Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7. |
| Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7. |
| Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7. |
| In Progress In a January 20 letter to the IAEA, Iran provided information about its uranium mines and mills, and the IAEA was able to access the Gchine mine on January 29. |
Provide figures that will allow the IAEA to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines. | Not Yet Completed |
Cap the size of the 5% enriched UF6 stockpile. | In Progress Iran is constructing a plant to convert 5% enriched UF6 to uranium dioxide, a powder suitable for power plant fuel, which will enable it to maintain a cap on its stockpile of UF6, which is not to exceed the amount Iran had an the beginning of implementation of the deal. As of the Feb. 20 IAEA report, Iran had not yet completed the plant, nor provided a timeframe for its operaitons. |
Iran Will Refrain From the Following Actions | Status |
Refrain from installing a reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide powder to 20% UF6. | Complying The January 20 IAEA report said that Iran does not have a reconversion line in place. |
Refrain from reproccessing or constructing a facility capable of reprocessing materials. | Complying In a January 18 letter to the IAEA, Iran said it will not engage in reprocessing or construct a reprocessing facility over the six months of the deal. The January 20 IAEA report confirmed that no reprocessing is taking place at the Tehran Reserach Reactor or MIX facility. |
Refrain from making any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. (This includes not installing new centrifuges and not feeding UF6 into the roughly half the centrifuges at Natanz that are installed but not yet enriching uranium.) | Complying The IAEA verified in the February 20 report that Iran has not made any further advances and no new centrifuges are enriching uranium. |
Refrain from making any further advances of its activities at Fordow. (This includes not installing new centrifuges, not feeding UF6 into the three quarters at Fordow that are installed but not yet enriching uranium, and not interconnecting the cascades.) | Complying The IAEA verified that Iran has not made any further advances and no new centrifuges are enriching uranium. |
Replacing existing centrifuges only with centrifuges of the same type. | Complying As of the February 20 IAEA report, the agency did not report any violation of this restriction, and survelliance has been set up to monitor any changes. |
Refrain from commissioning the heavy water reactor at Arak. | Complying The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further the Arak reactor. |
Refrain from transfering fuel or heavy water to the Arak reactor. | Complying The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further the Arak reactor. |
Refrain from testing additional fuel or producing more fuel. | Complying The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not manufactured or tested any reactor fuel, and the number of fuel rods produced remains at 11. |
Refrain from installing any additional reactor components at the Arak site. | Complying The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further advance the Arak reactor. |
Limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines. | Not Yet Verified |
Refrain from constructing any new locations for enrichment. | Complying In a January 18 letter to the IAEA Iran said it would not pursue any new uranium enrichment sites during the six months of the agreement. |
Click here for the full U.N. report.