On April 21, President Barack Obama assured leaders from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries that the United States will “deter and confront external aggression” against them. “Our nations committed to continuing to interdict illegal Iranian arms shipments in the region, impose costs on Iran for its ballistic missile program, and oppose Iran's destabilizing actions in the region,” he said. But the president told reporters that the greatest area of “tactical” differences between Washington and the GCC centered on how to deal with Iran. Several GCC countries have accused Iran of meddling in their domestic affairs and supporting terror.
#SaudiArabia's King Salman chairing GCC-US Summit in #Riyadh Thursday. — SPA #GCCSummit #Obama pic.twitter.com/tDEScVtNfw
— Saudi Gazette (@Saudi_Gazette) April 21, 2016
Some GCC allies warned against being “naïve” regarding Iran. Obama, however, argued that the nuclear deal is proof that dialogue could work. He also called for building a strong defense against Iran while reaching out to “the more reasonable forces in Iran so we don’t see an escalation in proxy fights across the region.”
The president arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on April 20. Before the summit, he met with King Salman for two hours and had a “very open and honest discussion” that covered issues that the two differ on, according to Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security advisor. The following are excerpted remarks by Obama and administration officials on Iran.
President Barack Obama
“Well, I think that a lot of the strain [between Washington and the GCC] was always overblown. The fact of the matter is, is that the friendship and cooperation that exist between the United States and the Gulf countries has been consistent for decades. During the course of our administration, the GCC countries have extensively cooperated with us on counterterrorism, on curbing the financing of terrorist activities. They are part of the counter-ISIL coalition that has made progress both in Syria and in Iraq.”
“In Yemen, we now have a cessation of hostilities that allows us to build a peace process that can relieve the suffering of the people inside of Yemen. That would not have happened had it not been for the GCC-U.S. cooperation. We would not have gotten an Iran deal to get their nuclear weapons had not the GCC been supportive of it.
“So what is true between the United States and the GCC, as is true with all of our allies and friends, is that at any point in time, there are going to be differences in tactics.”
“I think it is no doubt true that when we entered into the negotiations with Iran around the nuclear deal, there was concern that in the interest of getting the deal done, we would somehow look the other way with respect to their other destabilizing activities. And in fact, what we are able to report is not only have we seen Iran do what it was supposed to do under the deal and the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon is greatly reduced, but what we’ve also seen, what the GCC has seen, is our continued cooperation in, for example, interdicting Iranian efforts to arm the Houthi militias inside of Yemen. That, I think, has created some confidence.
“But one of the things, at a time when the region is so fraught with so many different problems and challenges, is the need for more consistent institutionalized communication at every level of government. And that’s part of what we’ve been able to achieve through these two summits. And my hope is, is that it will continue into the next administration. I think it has been highly useful, because the possibilities of misunderstanding increase when there’s so much activity taking place.
“I’ll give you one last example. Inside of Iraq, there are understandable concerns about Iranian influence in the Iraqi government at a time when the Iraqi government is also critical for us fighting ISIL. It was very important I think for us to describe our assessment that Prime Minister Abadi is in fact effectively fighting against ISIL and trying to reach out to Sunnis inside of Iraq, while acknowledging that there are significant problems in terms of government stability inside of Baghdad. And that’s a reason for us not to withdraw, but rather to get more involved in helping to stabilize areas like Anbar, where we’ve not cleared out ISIL but the towns that they were governing have been left devastated. If we want Sunni communities to be able to rebuild themselves and to get back into the lives they were leading before ISIL took over, then we’re going to have to help the Iraqi government respond.”
“Obviously, ultimately it's up to the Iraqis to make these decisions. It's not up to us, it's not up to the Iranians, it's not up to GCC countries. It's up to the Iraqi people to determine the government that they form.”
“Probably the biggest area where there's been tactical differences has been with respect to Iran. And the issue is not the need for shared cooperation to deter against Iranian provocations -- on that, we're all agreed. I think that there has been concern, even when we were working on the Iran nuclear deal, that if we were in discussions with them about these issues, that somehow Iran would feel emboldened to act more provocatively in the region.
“And what I've said to them is we have to have a dual track. We have to be effective in our defenses and hold Iran to account where it is acting in ways that are contrary to international rules and norms. But we also have to have the capacity to enter into a dialogue to reduce tensions and to identify ways in which the more reasonable forces inside of Iran can negotiate with the countries in the region, with its neighbors, so that we don't see an escalation of proxy fights across the region.
“And I think that that view is one that is consistent with how many in the GCC view it, but because there's been so much mistrust that's been built up -- in part because of Iranian provocations -- that people are cautious and want to make sure that nobody is naïve about what Iran may be doing to stir up problems in other countries.
“And what we've consistently shown them is we're not naïve. But as I pointed out, during the height of the Cold War, both Democratic Presidents like John F. Kennedy and Republican Presidents like Ronald Reagan still negotiated with the Soviet Union. Even when the Soviet Union was threatening the destruction of the United States, there was still dialogue so that we could find ways to reduce tensions and the dangers of war and chaos. And that's the same approach that we have to take. Even as Iran is calling us "The Great Satan," we were able to get a deal done where they got rid of their nuclear stockpiles, and that makes us safer. That's not a sign of weakness, that's a sign of strength.”
—April 21, 2016, to the press
“I thanked our GCC partners for their support of the comprehensive deal that has now cut off every single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon. That makes the region safer. We’ll remain vigilant to ensure that Iran fulfills its commitments, just as we will fulfill ours.
“Even with the nuclear deal, we recognize collectively that we continue to have serious concerns about Iranian behavior. Our nations committed to continuing to interdict illegal Iranian arms shipments in the region, impose costs on Iran for its ballistic missile program, and oppose Iran's destabilizing actions in the region.
“At the same time, as I said at Camp David last year, none of our nations have an interest in conflict with Iran. We welcome an Iran that plays a responsible role in the region -- one that takes concrete, practical steps to build trust and resolve its differences with its neighbors by peaceful means and abides by international rules and norms.”
—April 21, 2016, to the press with King Salman after the GCC summit
Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes
Rhodes: The President and Sheikh Al-Sabah [of Kuwait] also exchanged thoughts on how to approach Iran's troubling behavior in the region, but also agreed on the importance of engaging Iran with the aim of moving it toward a different, improved relationship with the Gulf.
Question: Ben, Saudi and Gulf leaders feel like the Iranian regime really poses an existential threat to them. So do you think their fear is irrational? What do you say in these meetings? And do you understand their frustration that they’re being asked to reach out to a country that is recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism and make nice with them?
Rhodes: So we made very clear to the leaders last night and today on the subject of Iran that our partners, our friends in this region are in the room with us here, and Iran, on the other hand, has in many ways been confrontational not just to the countries here in the GCC, but to the United States as well, and that we share their concerns about Iran's ballistic missile program, its destabilizing activities in the region, its ongoing support for terrorism.
And, in fact, many of the capabilities that we're developing on the defense side through this process are focused on countering Iranian actions. So when you talk about the ability to have enhanced missile defense systems, maritime interdictions, training of Special Forces -- all of these deal with the type of asymmetric threats that we see emanating from Iran in different parts of the region. And we've been able to have from the United States and several of our partners a number of interdictions, for instance, of Iranian weapon shipments at sea just in recent weeks.
At the same time, I think the point the President makes is that there has to be an opening to have a political resolution to these conflicts, that the perpetual nature of the violence that we see in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq is not in the interest of anybody, and that in order to resolve these conflicts there has to be a diplomatic effort with the Iranians. So in Syria, to the extent to which we can bring the Iranians to the table in supporting a political process, that is going to make it more likely that a political process can succeed.
In Iraq, obviously Iran has a series of relationships in Iraq. They have a degree of influence in Iraq, but that should not cause us to disengage. On the contrary, that I think raises the interest of the United States and the Gulf partners to support the Iraqi government and to remain engaged inside of Iraq.
So in all these different places, we have a similar assessment of the fact that Iran is engaged in destabilizing activities. We also just think that even as we are vigilant, even as we develop capabilities to counter Iranian actions, we have to have an openness to pursuing diplomatic solutions or else the region is just going to see a perpetuation of the conflicts that have already caused so much suffering and instability.
Question: Do you think it's irrational for the Saudis to worry that they’re no longer the U.S.’s key ally?
Rhodes: Well, I think on the core of the relationship, that remains very solid, and that includes our commitment to Saudi Arabian security and sovereignty. They are a country with whom we share significant interests in this region.
So we certainly understand this is their neighborhood. They’re worried about Iran and what its agenda is, and the actions that they’ve taken. Our point is simply that that concern with Iran should not foreclose the potential for diplomatic engagement if there’s an ability to resolve problems. And a recent example of course is the nuclear deal where, despite all of our concerns about Iran’s behavior, we were able to see a significant rollback in the Iranian nuclear program because we pursued a diplomatic process.
Question: Ben, I want to ask you about investment in not just armament and airplanes, but also investment in Special Forces and that sort of attack strategy for our Gulf partners. How does the conversation happen so that the President can get them away from, say, F-15s and more towards real steel on the ground, if you will?
And a second question is, does the President take his own advice, which is to say, listen, if he wants the Saudis and others to engage with the Iranians directly, will he take a trip to Tehran or maybe engage with them directly?
Rhodes: Well, first of all, your question is exactly the topic that we’re focused on in terms of military capabilities. And we really initiated this process in Camp David, and since then, we’ve had a working group that meets regularly to review and develop these defense capabilities. Ash Carter had a meeting here yesterday with the defense ministers to focus on this. And we’ve seen some progress in terms of the types of capabilities that GCC countries are investing in. We’ve aimed to expedite the transfer of certain capabilities to them.
And here’s where the focus is: The large-scale weapons systems that we’ve sold over many years that are important to Gulf security are not necessarily the capabilities that are best designed to deal with the threats that we face. So, for instance, if you look at conflicts as diverse as Syria or Yemen, the ability to have a significant Special Forces capability makes a big difference. And so we’re working to enhance and train and support the development of Gulf Special Forces, and that will be critical in dealing with the types of conflicts that we’ve seen here in the region.
The threat that they see from Iranian weapons shipments going to different groups in the region is best confronted by maritime interdiction capabilities. And this is often kind of small boats, not large naval movements. So we’ve been working to develop their maritime capacity.
Iran has a ballistic missile program and has an active cyber program. And our ability to work with the GCC to have an interoperable missile defense system will guard against that ballistic missile threat, give them greater assurance in their own security, just as they will want to have cyber defenses in the event of any Iranian cyber intrusion.
So we’ve made progress in each of those areas. We’ve worked to enhance Gulf capabilities in each of those areas. We have also worked to support interoperability between the GCC countries. And all of that is going to make them better prepared to deal with these threats. So these meetings are an opportunity to review that progress and determine what additional steps can be taken to expedite that process.
…
Oh, Iran. Yes. Well, I think the trip to Cuba was probably enough in terms of breaking a longstanding taboo. With respect to Iran, I think our approach has been that we will engage with the Iranians where we see an opportunity to make progress. The main vehicle for that engagement has been Secretary Kerry with Foreign Minister Zarif, not just on the Iranian nuclear issue but on Syria and other regional issues.
The President has always indicated that he is willing to engage the Iranian leadership if he believes that that can make progress on different issues. He’s spoken to President Rouhani on the phone. The fact of the matter is we haven't seen from the Iranians I think a desire for that level of engagement. They’ve really focused on the channel between our foreign ministers. And so that's where I think it's most likely to continue.
But that speaks to what we're trying to foster, which is a dynamic where we can have a diplomatic dialogue with the Iranians on issues related to these regional conflicts. Precisely because Iran has had a role in these areas, we would like to try to move them in a more constructive direction. And that requires some amount of dialogue. It also requires vigilance in the type of military capabilities.
Rhodes: So it’s important now that the U.S., our Gulf partners are reinforcing the importance of this opportunity, and we’re strongly urging Russia to use its influence and, frankly, Iran as well, to try to sustain what has been an opening for the Syrian people to enjoy a greater degree of calm than we’ve of course had the last several years. …
So the specific Supreme Court decision dealt with a question of separation of powers. And it determined that a bill that was passed through Congress and signed by the President could serve as a means for victims of terrorism to seek assets from the Iranian government. We, of course, very much support the efforts of those families. …
So given Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and given the various financial tools that we have to hold them accountable to designated individuals, we believe that part of that is allowing for this type of process to go forward. The problem with the JASTA legislation is it applies to all countries. It would suggest that the principle of sovereign immunity does not hold for countries. And again, that opens the door to potential blowback on the United States. …
Question: You shared the Saudis' assessment with Iran and sharing those fears, but you also mentioned a new and improved relationship with the Gulf. How far are the Gulf partners willing to go? Obviously something that this afternoon session will be focused on, but what indications have you gotten from the Gulf partners that they are willing to bring Iran into the fold?
Rhodes: Yes, I mean, look, I think we share the assessment of Iranian behavior. We do think that it's imperative that we're focused on the fight against ISIL and that we can have an openness to diplomacy and engagement with Iran in the service of resolving regional conflicts. I think we've gotten thus far from the Gulf countries and the Saudis yesterday certainly a lot of concerns about Iran, but an openness to that engagement. They have not expressed an opposition to the notion that they would have some diplomatic contact or dialogue with the Iranians.
I do think that they're very skeptical, and I think that's not a surprise to anybody. Our point is simply that we can put ourselves in a position of strength, we can do that in part from the development of the capabilities that I talked about. At the same time, the best way to try to resolve these issues and encourage Iran to move in a more constructive direction is a mix of standing up to Iran when it's necessary but also being open to diplomacy where we can make progress.
And the fact of the matter is, Iran itself is not monolithic. There are elements of the Iranian system that are more invested in conflict and that there are elements of the Iranian system that are more open to diplomacy. And part of what we've indicated is it's important for us to work with those inside of Iran who are more open to a constructive relationship, rather than to allow the hardliners there to dominate the regional engagement.
—April 21, 2016, during the U.S.-GCC summit