The U.S. Navy has decided to discipline nine personnel who were responsible for the detention of U.S. sailors by Iranian forces in January 2016. Iran seized two U.S. Navy vessels that had deviated from their chartered course between Kuwait and Bahrain and held them on Farsi Island in the Persian Gulf. Nine men and one woman were aboard the small riverine boats. A high-profile Navy report, released on June 30, concluded that a variety of errors and lack of oversight at multiple levels led to the detention of the vessels. Multiple leaders were “derelict in their duties,” the Navy concluded. The report, however, also found fault with the Iranians. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson told reporters that “Iran violated international law by impeding the boats' innocent passage transit and they violated our sovereign immunity by boarding, searching and seizing the boats and by photographing and video recording the crew.”
NEW: Iran state TV releases photos of the 10 Navy sailors that were held by Iran yesterday: https://t.co/hF17Pawckg pic.twitter.com/VsOrE7JuhR
— ABC News (@ABC) January 13, 2016
Iranian media and state television published pictures and video of the sailors being detained and later eating Iranian food. In an interview with state television, one sailor apologized for entering Iranian waters and thanked the Iranians for their hospitality and “fantastic” behavior. The sailors were released unharmed after 16 hours and a flurry of diplomatic efforts, but the incident was viewed as an embarrassment for the Navy.
In May, Cmdr. Eric Rasch, commanding officer of Coastal Riverine Squadron 3, was removed from his position and temporarily reassigned. On June 24, a higher level officer was removed, Capt. Kyle S. Moses. In August, Lt. David Nartker, who was in charge of the lead boat, received an unspecified punishment. The investigation found that Nartker violated the U.S. code of conduct for captured troops by apologizing to the Iranians. Nartker, however, appealed the decision. Out of the nine officers and enlisted who were cited, three were members of the crews. The others reportedly were higher level supervisors or shore support staff. The following are excerpts from the Navy’s redacted report on the incident.
Findings:
1. Tactical and On-Scene Failures. The RCB Boat Captains and crews were derelict in performing their duties to expected norms and standards. They did not conduct mission planning or produce a Concept of Operations (CON OPS) brief; they did not review the PIM; they deviated from the PIM without authority; ••••••• they failed to report the engine casualty to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC); they failed to report the sighting of unpredicted land; and they failed to maintain maneuver while repairing one of the RCB engines.
2. Supervisory Leadership Failures. •••••••••• , Commander, Task Force 56 (CTF 56) and········ Task Group 56.7 (CTG 56.7) inappropriately tasked their subordinates beyond the capabilities and limitations of their training and craft. They did not ensure adequate planning and preparation, and failed to conduct adequate risk management. CTF 56's "can do/will do" culture, especially in the face of short-notice tasking, frequently compromised appropriate risk management and I procedural compliance.
3. Operational Planning Failures. ••••••• (CTF 56) and ••••••• (CTG 56. 7) failed to ensure that the transit was properly planned. The transit had lacked sufficient "go/no-go" criteria, did not have a fully-developed communications plan, did not anticipate the potential for interactions with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and Iranian Navy (fRfN), failed to provide Pre-Planned Responses (PPRs) for Iranian interactions. Contrary to ••••••• (C5F) intent ••••••• and the C5F staff failed to ensure the RCBs had surface or air overwatch during the transit.
4. Inadequate TOC/MOC Oversight. An atypical transit such as this should have been overseen at the CTF 56 Maritime OperatiOns Center (MOC) level, but ••••••• failed to take ownership of the transit and delegated oversight to CTG 56.7. CTG 56.7 then failed to plan for accountable and engaged Tactical Operations Center (TOC) oversight during the transit. As a result, junior watchstanders coordinated the transit; oversight was disjointed and ineffective, and incident response was passive and reactionary as events unfolded.
5. Compliance with International Law. It was reasonable for Iran to investigate the unusual appearance of armed U.S. Naval vessels within territorial waters so close to its shores. However, the IRGCN's obstruction, at gunpoint, of the RCBs' transit infringed upon their right of innocent passage under international law and was disproportionate under the circumstances. Iran's boarding and seizure of the RCBs followed by the interrogation and video recording of the crew clearly violated established norms of sovereign immunity. The RCB crews, although not operating in accordance with established U.S. Navy procedures, did act consistently with international Jaw.
6. Pre-Deployment Training. The RCB crews received adequate predeployment training in accordance with established Fleet training requirements. Predeployment training and manning were not contributing factors to this incident.
Causal, Contributing, and Other Significant Factors
The factors that led to this incident are complex, but can be divided into one of three
categories.
Category A: Causal factors that, if corrected, would have interrupted the chain of
events and prevented the incident from occurring.
l. •••• (CTF 56) demonstrated poor leadership by ordering the transit on short notice without due regard to mission planning and risk assessment. He severely underestimated the complexity and hazards associated with the transit. He lacked a questioning attitude, failed to promote a culture of safety, and disregarded appropriate backup from his staff and subordinate commands.
2. ••••The CTG 56.7 Commanding Officer, exercised poor leadership in that he failed to set the conditions for success prior to the transit. When tasked with extending the RCBs in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG), he failed to adapt support and oversight of his disaggregated forces, resulting in degraded RCB maintenance, declining standards, and poor morale. •••• failed to provide appropriate oversight of CTG 56. 7 leadership to ensure the crews conducted proper voyage planning for the transit, and was derelict in his responsibility to review and approve the navigation track. He also failed to properly train his TOCs and plan for TOC oversight of the transit, further hindering awareness and delaying response time.
3. When tasked with the transit from Kuwait to Bahrain, the Kuwait detachment Officer-in-Charge and both RCB Boat Leaders were derelict in their duties in that they failed to meet even the most basic requirements of leadership, planning and tactical execution. The two RCB Boat Captains made poor tactical decisions during the transit that further compounded these problems. Unprepared and unaware, the boat crews were late in responding to approaching IRGCN patrol craft, delaying action to establish a heightened security posture. Their lack of adequate force protection left them with few realistic options to resist detention.
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