Iran has raised tensions in the Middle East by increasing the number, range and capability of its rockets and missiles, according to an updated report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Tehran’s “missile and rocket forces help compensate for its lack of effective air power and allow it to pose a threat to its neighbors and U.S. forces,” the report warns.
The interim agreement reached by Iran and the world’s six major powers in November could be a key step toward a “major breakthrough in eliminating this [nuclear] threat and laying the groundwork for broader easing of tensions in the region,” the report noted. But in the years potentially needed to reach an agreement and ensure full compliance, Tehran could develop conventional armed missiles that could hit key targets in the Gulf. The following is a summary of the report by Iran Primer author Anthony Cordesman and Bryan Gold.
Iran and The Gulf Military Balance II: The Nuclear and Missile Dimensions
The report shows that Iran’s current missile and rocket forces help compensate for its lack of effective air power and allow it to pose a threat to its neighbors and U.S. forces that could affect their willingness to strike Iran should Iran use its capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the Gulf or against any of its neighbors. At another level, Iran’s steady increase in the number, range, and capability of its rocket and missile forces has increased the level of tension in the Gulf, and in other regional states like Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. Iran has also shown that it will transfer long-range rockets to “friendly” or “proxy” forces like the Hezbollah and Hamas.
At a far more threatening level, the report shows that Iran has acquired virtually every element of a nuclear breakout capability before the recently minted interim agreement was reached in Geneva, except the fissile material needed to make a weapon. This threat led to a growing “war of sanctions,” and Israeli and U.S. threats of preventive strikes. Concurrently, the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programs cannot be separated from the threat posed by Iran’s growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the Gulf and along all of its borders.
It is far from clear that either the latest negotiations or sanctions can succeed in limiting Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons and deploy nuclear-armed missiles; however, the report shows that military options offer uncertain alternatives. Both Israel and the U.S. have repeatedly stated that they are planning and ready for military options that could include preventive strikes on at least Iran’s nuclear facilities, and that U.S. strikes might cover a much wider range of missile facilities and other targets.
A preventive war might trigger a direct military confrontation or conflict in the Gulf with little warning. It might also lead to at least symbolic Iranian missile strikes on U.S. basing facilities, GCC targets, or Israel. Moreover, it could lead to much more serious covert and proxy operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, the rest of the Gulf, and other areas.
Furthermore, unless preventive strikes were reinforced by a lasting regime of follow-on strikes, they could trigger a much stronger Iranian effort to actually acquire and deploy nuclear weapons and/or Iranian rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and negotiations. The U.S., in contrast, might deem that it has no choice other than to maintain a military overwatch and restrike capability to ensure Iran could not carry out such a program and rebuild its nuclear capabilities or any other capabilities that were attacked.
The end result is that Israel, the U.S., and Arab states cannot choose between preventive war and containment. Unless Iran fundamentally changes its present course, the choice is between preventive strike and containment, or containment alone. Preventive strikes may be able to delay Iran for a given period of time, but if Iran seeks to rebuild it nuclear capabilities, then Israel, the U.S., and Arab will have to strengthen their missile and other defenses, develop great retaliatory capabilities, and/or restrike every new Iranian effort towards nuclear weapons.
Finally, Volume II: The Nuclear and Missile Dimensions shows that a nuclear arms race already exists between Israel and Iran - albeit one where only Israel now has a nuclear strike capability. The practical problem this raises for Iran - and for stabilizing this arms race - is that it will face a possible Israeli first strike option until it can secure its nuclear armed forces. This pushes it towards a concealed or breakout deployment, and an initial phase where it would have to launch on warning or under attack until it has a survivable force. It then must compete with powers with far larger stockpiles which include boosted and thermonuclear weapons until it can create a more sophisticated force of its own. The options will result in a high-risk arms race, particularly during its initial years, for all sides and do so regardless of the level of containment.
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