Part II – Testimony by U.S. Officials

The following are excerpts from Congressional testimony at a Nov. 15 hearing on the Obama Administration’s policy toward Iran. The three officials appeared before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
 
 
Mr. Adam Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury
 
Notwithstanding the sincere offer of engagement extended to the Iranian government by the
United States since the outset of this Administration, Iran has refused to respond meaningfully. In order to compel Iran to change its approach and to make clear to Iran the consequences of its existing approach, the United States is implementing a broad-based pressure strategy.
 
Among the most important elements of this strategy are targeted financial measures designed both to disrupt Iran's illicit activity and to protect the international financial sector from Iran's abuse. Our actions have focused on key government entities involved in Iran's illicit conduct, including nearly two dozen Iranian state-owned banks; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its external arm, the IRGC-Qods Force; and, Iran's national maritime carrier, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and its affiliates. This strategy has yielded significant results. We have imposed costs directly on the entities we sanctioned, and by focusing our efforts on exposing Iranian entities' illicit and deceptive activities, we have built support among foreign governments to take similar actions. The global private sector also has amplified our actions - often taking voluntary steps beyond their legal requirements - because our actions have highlighted the pervasive nature of Iran's illicit and deceptive conduct and the reputational risks associated with any Iran-related business…
 
Although we are making progress, there is, of course, still much to be done. Iran is feeling the impact of the pressure, but we have yet to achieve the objective of our dual-track strategy: concrete action by Iran to comply with its international obligations and to address the international community's concerns regarding its nuclear program. Last week's release of the IAEA report only makes more clear to the world the severity of the current situation.
 
 
 
Mr. Henry Wooster, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State
 
Our domestic measures are dissuading foreign companies from doing business in Iran, and this is inflicting financial, logistical, and economic pain on key sectors that support its proliferation efforts. Companies from other sectors have even voluntarily opted out of the Iranian market, including automotive firms Daimler, Toyota, and Kia, as well as Germany’s ThyssenKrupp. Caterpillar decided to prohibit its non-U.S.subsidiaries from exporting to Iran. The Swiss engineering firm ABB Ltd.; the Italian defense, aerospace, energy and transportation firm Finmeccanica; and the Irish industrial company Ingersoll-Rand Plc have all chosen to end their business with Iran. As the list of designated individuals and entities continues to grow, so does the cost, time, and energy required for Iran to pursue its current policies. Iran has felt the effect of these actions, as Iranian President Ahmadinejad recently admitted in a speech to the parliament when he said, “Which government can work under so much pressure? … Every day, all our banking and trade activities and our agreements are being monitored and blocked. This is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history.” 
 
The result of our strategy is an Iran that is finding dwindling options for doing business internationally. But pressure is not an end unto itself, and this Administration remains committed to engagement with Iran through the P5+1 framework, and with other nations to address the threats posed by Iran…. If, however, Iran simply seeks to buy time to make further progress in its nuclear program, it will face ever-stronger measures and ever-increasing isolation…
 
At the same time, we use domestic and multilateral measures to call attention to and curb the regime’s behavior on another issue, human rights. With a long track record of human rights abuses, Tehran hit a new low with its systematic campaign of violence and intimidation against the massive demonstrations by Iranians in 2009, when they were protesting against fraud and manipulation in their presidential election. The regime and its forces beat back thousands of protesters, arrested hundreds, and killed dozens more. They detained – and continue to detain – prominent opposition figures; tortured, raped, and killed prisoners; and conducted more than 100 show trials. Despite the government’s best efforts to censor its population, many courageous Iranians found ways to share with the rest of the world their horrific stories of being attacked, silenced, and tortured.
 
 
 
Mr. Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense
 
The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in our whole-of government strategy of engagement and pressure toward Iran, which is led by the State and Treasury Departments. However, a supporting role should not be confused with a minor one. In support of interagency efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and counter its destabilizing efforts, the Department of Defense focuses on four major lines of effort. These efforts are: (1) ensuring Israel’s security; (2) building partnership capacity in the region; (3) developing a regional security architecture in the Gulf; and (4) prudent defense planning…
 
 We continue to work with partners in the region to build capacity to defend against Iranian destabilizing influence, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon. By the end of next month, we will complete the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Some have expressed concerns that we leaving behind a vacuum for Iran to fill. However, we are not disengaging from Iraq, and there is no vacuum for Iran to fill.
 
Due the extraordinary sacrifices of our armed forces, civilians, and the Iraqis, Iraq has emerged as an increasingly stable, sovereign, and self-reliant nation. Iraq has no desire to be dominated by Iran or anyone else. Iraqi nationalism is strong, and the Iraqis have consistently shown their willingness to resist the Iranians and their surrogates when Tehran has over-reached. This will continue as Iraq’s economy grows, particularly through its oil industry. 
The Iraqis have also made clear that they desire a strong and enduring relationship with the United States, including robust security cooperation, and we will purse that partnership under the Strategic Framework Agreement.